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Constitutional Clause Aggregation and
the Marijuana Crimes
Scott W. Howe*
Abstract
An important question for our time concerns whether the
Constitution could establish a right to engage in certain
marijuana-related activities. Several states have now legalized
cannabis, within strict limits, for recreational purposes, and that
number will grow. Yet, some states will not promptly legalize but,
instead, continue to criminalize, or only “decriminalize” in minor
ways, and the federal criminalization statutes also will likely
survive for a time. There currently is no recognized right under the
Constitution to possess, use, cultivate, or distribute cannabis for
recreational purposes, even in small amounts, and traditional,
single-clause arguments for such a right are weak. Neither the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Fourth Amendment,
the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause can justify
such a protection, and that would remain true even when most
states have legalized. But, could another theory justify this
constitutional right?
A second important and topical legal question concerns when
two or more rights-based clauses in the Constitution can combine
to invalidate government action that none of the clauses could
disallow on their own. The Supreme Court generally has declined
to recognize multiple-clause rights. But, in the past, it occasionally
seemed to endorse the approach. And, recently, in Obergefell v.
* Frank L. Williams Professor of Criminal Law, Dale E. Fowler School of
Law, Chapman University. My thanks to Robert Mikos for reviewing a previous
draft of the Article and generously sharing his expertise on marijuana law and
policy. My thanks also to my Chapman colleagues, Celestine McConville, Sherry
Leysen, Wendy Seiden and Mike Lang for reviewing previous drafts and
providing valuable assistance of various kinds and at various stages of this
project. My deepest thanks to Jetty Maria Cascante Howe for assistance of the
most important and pervasive kind, without which the Article would not have
reached fruition.

779

780

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 779 (2018)

Hodges, it gave new impetus to the idea by declaring the existence
of a “synergy” between the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses that it asserted had helped explain its acknowledgment of
certain rights previously and that purportedly helped lead, in the
case at hand, to its acknowledgment of a right to same-sex
marriage. In consequence, enthusiasm has again intensified over
the notion that rights-based clause aggregation can expand
constitutional protections. But, is clause aggregation only rhetoric
offered to justify something the Court would have done anyway
under a single clause or can it sometimes really matter? And, if so,
when?
This Article puts both problems in play by asking this question:
After a super-majority of states legalize, could multiple clauses
together reveal a constitutional right to engage in certain
recreational marijuana activities? The Article answers with
cautious affirmance: Clause aggregation could help justify such a
constitutional right, in tightly limited circumstances. But, the
Article also notes that many of the contours remain undeveloped in
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on rights-based clause
aggregation, complicating any effort to predict whether and how the
Justices would apply it in the future to recreational marijuana.
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I. Introduction

The movement to legalize cannabis, or marijuana, for
recreational purposes is one of the important legal stories of our
time. Through acts of direct democracy, eight states plus the
District of Columbia since 2012 have “legalized,”1 within tight
limits, the possession, use, cultivation and distribution of
marijuana for recreational purposes.2 Many other states have
recently created exceptions for medical use or have decriminalized
first-time possession cases.3 The rapidity of these developments
suggests that a majority of states may fully legalize
marijuana-related activities in limited circumstances in the years
ahead. Yet, some states will surely resist the trend and even
continue to criminalize possession of small amounts, because the
use of cannabis is still widely viewed as immoral and somewhat
dangerous,4 and the survival of those perceptions will vary across
the country. There is also doubt that Congress will soon legalize at
the federal level,5 and the absence of opportunities for direct
1. I use the term “legalize” in a non-technical sense throughout the Article
to denote only a state’s elimination of its own prohibitions on certain
marijuana-related activities. The federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801–904 (2012), criminalizes, among other things, possessing, cultivating,
distributing and manufacturing cannabis, and those federal prohibitions continue
to apply in states that have repealed their criminal prohibitions on certain
marijuana-related activities. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
state laws cannot authorize what federal law prohibits. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
For a discussion of state and federal laws governing marijuana-related activities,
see ROBERT A. MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY AND AUTHORITY 35–194 (2017).
2. See Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 30, 2017),
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx
(last visited Mar 5, 2018) [hereinafter NCSL, Marijuana Overview] (noting
that “[e]ight States and the District of Columbia now have legalized small
amounts of marijuana for adult recreational use” and, in every case, through an
act of direct democracy by the populace) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
3. Thirteen states, beyond those that have legalized, have decriminalized
the possession and use of small amounts of marijuana. Id. In addition, another
eight states allow for the medical use of marijuana. State Medical Marijuana
Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 14, 2017), www.ncsl.org/research/
health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2018) [hereinafter
NCSL, State Medical Marijuana Laws] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
4. See infra notes 144–148 and accompanying text (indicating a trend
against legalization of recreational marijuana in some states).
5. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Surprising Collapse of Marijuana
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democracy in the federal arena confirms that the federal crimes
could survive for several years.6 This specter raises the question
whether reformers could at some point successfully urge the
judiciary to legalize certain marijuana-related activities under the
federal Constitution.
Under any of the constitutional clauses that come to mind, the
arguments for even tightly circumscribed legalization for
recreational use are not compelling, even when a majority of states
plus the District of Columbia have legalized recreational
marijuana. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the
Eighth Amendment7 probably would not work. With the federal
government and many states still criminalizing the conduct, the
Court would not likely find a sufficiently strong societal consensus
against the minor marijuana crimes to hold that they violate the
Eighth Amendment.8 The Fourth Amendment would not work,
although marijuana crimes have significantly reduced persons’
freedom from police intrusions.9 The essence of the Fourth
Amendment is that searches and seizures must be reasonable,10
and the existence of the marijuana crimes themselves has been
Prohibition: What Now?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 573, 592 (2016) (noting the
“befuddling abdication of responsibility by Congress” in addressing the need for
change to the federal marijuana laws).
6. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress,
unlike the states, has no referendum option to spur legislative change).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
8. In the modern era, the Supreme Court has not invalidated the death
penalty under the Eighth Amendment in circumstances when that punishment
is allowed by federal civilian law, but has invalidated that punishment in several
circumstances in which federal law and a majority of states disallow it. See Scott
W. Howe, The Federal Death Penalty and the Constitutionality of Capital
Punishment, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 1388, 1390–91 (2014) (discussing three recent
categories of offenders for which the Court rejected the death penalty—mentally
disabled offenders, youthful offenders, and child rapists).
9. See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 282–
84 (1968) (discussing how drug crimes, among other vice crimes, cause the police
to become “snoopers” and “harassers,” especially among the urban poor).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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understood generally to authorize reasonable police invasions
focused on cannabis.11 The Due Process Clauses12 probably would
not work, because recreational marijuana use does not easily
qualify as a “fundamental right.”13 Likewise, the Equal Protection
Clause14 would not seem to work, because there is no suspect
classification or improper discriminatory purpose involved and
marijuana-related activities arguably will cause at least some risk
of minor harm to the actor and to others,15 which the criminalizing
states—to demonstrate a “rational basis” for their statutes16—can
argue they seek to prevent.
For civil-libertarians and those who hope to obtain and use
cannabis legally in places where it will remain illegal, the
troubling aspect of this clause-by-clause approach is that it fails to
capture the force of the overall case for legalization. Gallup polls
11. See, e.g., Susan F. Mandiberg, Marijuana Prohibition and the Shrinking
of the Fourth Amendment, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 23, 39 (2012) (concluding that
“at the Supreme Court level, marijuana has played a central role in cases where
probable cause or reasonable suspicion was based at least in part on an officer’s
‘plain smell,’” and citing thirteen cases).
12. There are Due Process Clauses in both the Fifth Amendment, which
applies against the federal government, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which
applies against the states. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that
“[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent
part, that “[n]o State . . . shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
13. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (recognizing the right to
an abortion as a “fundamental right” protected by the Due Process Clause).
14. The Equal Protection Clause appears in the Fourteenth Amendment,
which applies against the states. The relevant language provides that “[n]o state
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Supreme Court has declared that equal
protection principles apply against the federal government through the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499–500 (1954) (finding that the Equal Protection Clause is enforceable against
the District of Columbia because “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process”).
15. See JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 34 (2012) [hereinafter CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA
LEGALIZATION] (discussing the risks of using marijuana and concluding that,
while there are some, “[e]stimating the extent of marijuana-related damage to
users, their families, their neighbors, and the wider public” is complex).
16. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (describing the “rational basis” standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause).
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already reveal super-majority support at the national level for
legalization for recreational purposes.17 Although repeal of minor
marijuana crimes by a majority of states might not suffice under
the Eighth Amendment without legalization at the federal level,
the claim would still reveal a high level of societal consensus
favoring legalization. Also, the criminalization of cannabis has
played an outsize role in the modern obligation of the police to
snoop, meddle, and harass,18 in part because the Fourth
Amendment cases do not define “reasonableness” differently when
the search is for a mere “roach”19 of marijuana rather than, for
example, the bloody knife used in a murder.20 Also, while engaging
in marijuana-related activities may not appear, based on history,
to qualify as a “fundamental” right for due process purposes, use
of the drug is increasingly understood to bring substantial

17. See Justin McCarthy, Record-High Support for Legalizing Marijuana
Use in U.S., GALLUP NEWS (Oct. 25, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/
221018/record-high-support-legalizing-marijuana.aspx (last visited Dec. 26,
2017) (noting that “64% [of Americans] now say[] its use should be made legal”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. See PACKER, supra note 9, at 282–84 (observing that police are seen as
harassing the urban poor more often than others for vice crimes, including drug
offenses); see also CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 15, at
95–96 (discussing the reasons that criminalization of marijuana calls on police to
be more intrusive in their search and seizure practices); Kevin B. Zeese, Drug
War Forever?, in SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES: DRUG-CONTROL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES 251, 254, 260–61 (Melvyn B. Krauss & Edward P. Lazear eds.,
1991) (noting how governmental programs to discover marijuana cultivation after
the war on drugs commenced in the 1970s led to increased intrusions on privacy);
JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA—THE NEW PROHIBITION 43–44 (1970) (noting that “the
frequency of the hotly denied ‘furtive gesture’ or consent to search is reason for
prosecutors as well as other observers to suspect that police perjury as to
search-and-seizure issues in marijuana cases is not unknown”); Geoffrey Richard
Wagner Smith, Note, Possession of Marijuana in San Mateo County: Some Social
Costs of Criminalization, 22 STAN. L. REV. 101, 117 (1969) (“Since a search may
be made incident to a lawful misdemeanor arrest, officers who desire to search for
drugs may be tempted to make arrests for offenses they would ignore under other
circumstances.”).
19. A “roach” is the mostly smoked butt of a marijuana cigarette. For
discussion of cases that apply marijuana prohibitions to tiny amounts of the
substance, see MIKOS, supra note 1, at 47, 76.
20. See Mandiberg, supra note 11, at 24 (concluding that “the Court could
have developed virtually all of the same rules and standards” that it has
developed [under the Fourth Amendment] through cases involving other types of
evidence” than marijuana).
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pleasure or benefit to a huge portion of the population.21 In
addition, while marijuana use is not risk-free, evidence does not
suggest that it is more dangerous to the user or others than the
consumption of alcohol and tobacco, which is not criminalized.22
Indeed, the greatest dangers associated with cannabis for both the
user and society seem to flow mostly from its criminalization.23
And, the force of those arguments together, reformists would say,
paints criminalization as such an unpopular effort, involving such
21. See, e.g., Lester Grinspoon, Marijuana in a Time of
Psychopharmacological McCarthyism, in SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES:
DRUG-CONTROL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 387 (Melvyn B. Krauss & Edward
P. Lazear eds., 1991) (noting that “tens of millions of [our] citizens use cannabis,”
because they “not only like to use the substance, but in many cases believe that it
has enhanced their lives”).
22. See, e.g., Philip M. Boffey, What Science Says About Marijuana, N.Y.
TIMES (July 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/opinion/whatscience-says-about-marijuana.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2018) (summarizing
various studies revealing that marijuana is “less dangerous than the highly
addictive but perfectly legal substances known as alcohol and tobacco”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Wayne Hall, Robin Room & Susan
Bondy, World Health Organization Project on the Health Implications of Cannabis
Use: Comparative Appraisal of the Health and Psychological Consequences of
Alcohol, Cannabis, Nicotine and Opiate Use (Aug. 28, 1995),
www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/hemp/general/who-index.htm (last visited Mar. 5,
2018) (discussing the lesser harmfulness of marijuana than tobacco or alcohol to
both the user and others) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Marijuana use, depending on frequency, will pose some risks to the user’s
physical and mental health. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra
note 15, at 54–80 (discussing the risks and medical effects of marijuana use).
However, many experts believe that marijuana involves “less addictive risk than
tobacco, alcohol, cocaine, stimulants or heroin, not only in terms of likelihood of
dependence but also the degree of dependence.” Id. at 40. Also, the risk of fatal
overdose for marijuana is minimal compared to the risk of fatal overdose for
alcohol. See id. at 62–63 (noting research findings that, while the ratios of
“average fatal dose to average recreational dose . . . for heroin, alcohol,
methamphetamine and cocaine range from about six to fifteen,” there is “no
known fatal dose of marijuana”). For a recent study that uses a “margin of
exposure” approach (the ratio between toxicological threshold and estimated
human intake) and concludes that alcohol and tobacco are more dangerous than
cannabis, see Dirk W. Lachenmeir & Jurgen Rehm, Comparative Risk Assessment
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Cannabis and Other Illicit Drugs Using the Margin of
Exposure Approach, in 5 SCI. REP. 1, 4–6 (2015).
23. See, e.g., CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 15, at
109 (noting that “an arrest, even if it never leads to a conviction, sometimes means
spending a night or more in jail awaiting arraignment, and a night in jail is much
more dangerous than an evening stoned”); see id. at 98 (discussing the high
societal costs of incarceration and enforcement related to marijuana crimes).
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substantial invasions of privacy, to prosecute such
mildly-dangerous behavior, at such a high cost to the offender and
society as to be irrational.
A conclusion of irrationality under this expanded inquiry,
however, will not solve the problem of how to legalize cannabis
under the Constitution. Apart from other difficulties posed by the
individual-clause claims, for a court to pronounce marijuana
legalized under one or more clauses separately could set down a
problematic precedent or be misunderstood as having done so. If
laws criminalizing marijuana possession and use were deemed to
violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause without
legalization at the federal level by Congress, the death penalty
laws could soon seem cruel and unusual, too, despite the continued
existence of a federal death penalty.24 If those marijuana laws were
deemed to infringe the Fourth Amendment, other drug crimes
might also seem invalid, because they also spur many police
intrusions on privacy and liberty.25 If those laws were thought to
violate substantive due process, opioid crimes might also seem
invalid, because opioid use also brings pleasure and relief to many
persons.26 If those laws were thought to violate equal protection,
crimes like polygamy, prostitution and bestiality would all seem
vulnerable as well, given their lack of serious harm to participants
or others. And if the Court tried to describe the cannabis cases as
sui generis under any of those clauses, the decisions would
justifiably be seen as unfaithful to the notion of principled
decision-making.
How, then, could a court possibly understand the federal
Constitution to legalize recreational marijuana activities in the
face of continued federal criminalization, and without setting a
24. For discussion of the federal death penalty laws and their importance to
the continued view that the death penalty is not cruel and unusual, see Howe,
supra note 8, at 1388–91.
25. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 18, at 106 (noting in one study that, in
addition to marijuana, police searches frequently turned up amphetamines).
26. Evidence of this tendency appears in the large number of users despite
not only criminalization but the high risk of fatal overdose. Largely due to opioid
use, drug overdose deaths in the U.S. likely exceeded 59,000 in 2016. Josh Katz,
Drug Deaths in America Are Rising Faster Than Ever, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid-epidemic-drug-ov
erdose-deaths-are-rising-faster-than-ever.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2018) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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broad precedent? The best approach would seem to involve a
strategy of clause “aggregation.”27 Using this technique, several
clauses together could justify limited legalization even if none
could justify that outcome on their own.28 Because it would be
multi-sourced among clauses, this approach could also help cabin
the precedential sweep of the conclusion.29
A preliminary question, however, is whether this interpretive
approach is valid. The answer is not entirely clear. While the
Supreme Court generally has declined to employ clause
aggregation to identify new rights,30 occasionally it has seemingly
endorsed the approach by using two or more constitutional
provisions together to support the existence of a right31 or by
claiming that in past decisions this is what was really going on.
For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut,32 the Court famously (or
infamously33) pointed to “penumbras, formed by emanations” from
multiple clauses to justify a right of married couples to use
contraception.34 But, even earlier, in West Virginia Board of
27. See Ariel Porat & Eric Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2,
48–49 (2012) (describing the idea of “hybrid rights” in constitutional law as an
instance of “cross-claim normative aggregation”).
28. For “a systemic examination of combination analysis in U.S.
constitutional law,” or what I am calling a “clause aggregation approach,” see
Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1068
(2016).
29. See id. at 1104 (noting that “combination-based holdings will sometimes
qualify as narrower than their clause-specific counterparts, furnishing courts
with an effective means of limiting the precedential sweep of holdings they
pronounce”).
30. See id. at 1069–70 (“When litigants assert claims arising under multiple
areas of constitutional doctrine, the strengths or weaknesses of one clause-specific
claim typically have no official bearing on the strengths or weaknesses of
another.”).
31. See infra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court
decisions that utilized aggregating clauses).
32. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33. The approach has been harshly criticized. See, e.g., Robert G. Dixon, Jr.,
The “New” Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon,
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 84 (noting the Griswold Court’s “judicial power to declare
new freedoms whether or not illumined by the constitutional document, its
setting, or its easily inferred purposes”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 9–10 (1971) (“Griswold, then, is
an unprincipled decision, both in the way in which it derives a new constitutional
right and in the way it defines that right, or rather fails to define it.”).
34. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–86 (finding that married couples’ right to
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Education v. Barnette,35 the Court arguably did something similar.
Without clearly relying on any particular clause in the First
Amendment but possibly on principles underlying several of
them,36 the Court held that schoolchildren may not be required to
salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance.37 Also, after
Griswold, in Stanley v. Georgia,38 the Court seemed to use multiple
clauses in the First Amendment, and perhaps others as well, to
recognize a right to possess and view obscene pornography in the
privacy of one’s home.39 A much more recent example is Obergefell
v. Hodges,40 in which the Court identified a “synergy”41 between
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses that it indicated
had helped justify its previous recognition of several rights and, in
the case at hand, its acknowledgment of a right to same-sex
marriage.42
But, questions remain: Is this clause-aggregation approach
simply a rhetorical strategy employed by the Court to help
rationalize decisions post hoc that it would have reached under a
single clause anyway? If not, has the use of the technique been
applied with sufficient repetition and principle to reveal that it has
prescriptive force? And, if so, might a court properly conclude that
it could successfully work in the marijuana context?
This Article aims to answer those questions. Initially, I
assume that there is a case to be made against rights-based clause
aggregation on both descriptive and normative levels. I
hypothesize that aggregation of two or more rights-based clauses
has never been important in justifying any right under the federal
use contraceptives is imbedded in the right to privacy, which is “created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees”).
35. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
36. See Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L.
REV. F. 16, 26 (2015) (describing Barnette as relying “on no single clause of the
Bill of Rights but on the broader postulates of our constitutional order”).
37. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
38. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
39. See id. at 564–68 (holding that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime”).
40. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
41. Id. at 2603.
42. See id. at 2602–03 (finding that “[t]he right of same-sex couples to marry
that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too,
from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws”).
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Constitution, even if the Supreme Court may have cited two or
more clauses when first recognizing the protection. I also
hypothesize that rights-based clause aggregation (if it really
matters) is such a rare and unprincipled approach for rationalizing
new constitutional rights that it lacks normative power. However,
on both points I concede a failure of proof. While clause aggregation
is certainly under-theorized in the Court’s opinions as a
constitutional force, one cannot disprove that it sometimes has
carried logical influence in the phenomenology of judicial
decision-making.
Having failed to disprove the descriptive and normative cases
for constitutional clause aggregation, the Article addresses
whether the approach could work to support recreational
marijuana rights after a super-majority of states have legalized
that activity. The argument would be that clause aggregation
makes sense in the unusual case, as here, where litigants might
show that there are separate but aggregating harms associated
with each of the clauses.43 The harm from criminalization of
cannabis is not only the stigma and loss of freedom involved with
conviction and punishment (the cruel and unusual punishment
concern)44 but the substantial invasions of privacy that arise
through the especially intrusive kind of policing required to ferret
out cannabis violations (the Fourth Amendment concern)45 and the
loss of enjoyment and benefit from use by those who are deterred
by prohibition (the substantive due process concern).46 Those
harms are enhanced by the discriminatory actions of
government—by the non-prohibition of tobacco and alcohol, which
are at least as dangerous as cannabis (the equal protection

43. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative
Constitutional Rights 20 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law and Legal Theory
Research Paper No. 42, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2642640 (discussing the idea of “intersectionality” between clauses).
44. See infra Part III.A (evaluating the efficacy of the argument that the
criminal punishment of marijuana use violates the cruel and unusual
punishments clause).
45. See infra Part III.B (describing the potential Fourth Amendment claim
to a constitutional basis for recreational marijuana because of frequent police
interaction with marijuana users).
46. See Grinspoon, supra note 21, at 387 (noting the life-enhancing effects of
recreational marijuana use).
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concern).47 The multiple nature of these harms can be
acknowledged and weighed against a government interest in
criminalizing cannabis only by a clause-aggregation approach.
And, at least with respect to certain marijuana-related activities,
although only some, this more expansive scrutiny allows the
conclusion that government interests are inadequate to justify
continued criminalization.
My project proceeds in four parts, with the first two providing
background, and the third and fourth doing the central work. Part
II summarizes the development and current state of the criminal
laws regarding marijuana and the reasons to expect that, in the
next decade or two, a majority of states, but not the federal
Congress, will legalize it within limits for recreational purposes.48
Part III assumes that this scenario will materialize and
demonstrates why, when applied separately, neither the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the Due
Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause would establish a
right to engage in recreational marijuana activities, even in tightly
limited circumstances.49
Part IV explores the validity of aggregating rights-based
clauses to recognize a new constitutional right.50 I discuss a variety
of Supreme Court cases that arguably serve as precedent for such
an approach, including the Court’s recent decision in Obergefell,
which has heightened interest in the subject.51 And, despite
47. See Boffey, supra note 22 (comparing the dangerousness of alcohol and
tobacco versus marijuana and concluding that marijuana is no more dangerous
than alcohol and tobacco).
48. Infra Part II.
49. Infra Part III.
50. Infra Part IV.
51. Prominent, recent commentary discussing the clause-aggregation aspect
of Obergefell reflects this heightened enthusiasm. See, e.g., Coenen, supra note
28, at 1079 (“Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion cited to the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as mutually supportive
of the case’s result.”); Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 23–26 (analyzing
Justice Kennedy’s summary of other cases that evoke both the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses to rationalize his Obergefell opinion); Kenji Yoshino,
Comment, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147,
171–79 (2015) (comparing Lawrence v. Texas and Obergefell and finding that,
although there are differences in their analyses, the two cases implicate both
liberty and equality); see also Tribe, supra note 36 and accompanying text
(arguing “that Obergefell’s chief jurisprudential achievement is to have tightly
wound the double helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of
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skepticism, I demonstrate that one cannot disprove that clause
aggregation
sometimes
carries
influence
in
judicial
decision-making. I also conclude that the approach arguably has
been employed enough by the Court to suggest some patterns as to
how its application could work in the future.
Part V then explores whether a clause-aggregation approach
could help justify the judiciary in finding a constitutional right to
engage in certain marijuana-related activities.52 After a
super-majority of states have legalized, I explain how clause
aggregation might assist a court, without setting an expansive
precedent, to conclude that the Constitution, by requiring a
broader form of assessment than rational-basis inquiry, protects
the freedom of persons to engage in certain core marijuana-related
activities that those states have agreed should be legal. I also
respond to several likely objections. As part of this discussion, I
make the case that, despite recognition of such constitutional
rights, the regulation or criminalization of recreational marijuana
activities should continue to be widely, though not always,
permitted. But, I also explain that many of the contours in the
Supreme Court’s application of rights-based clause aggregation
remain undeveloped, complicating the effort to predict whether
and how the Justices would apply it in the future to recreational
marijuana activities.
II. The Past, Present, and Future of Marijuana Crimes
The history of marijuana criminalization in the United States
spans over a hundred years and reflects a complex story of racism,
fear-mongering, widespread ignorance, politics, international
relations and, ultimately, popular revolt.53 Large parts of the story
equal dignity”).
52. Infra Part V. Part V contends that a clause-aggregation approach is the
best methodology to support a limited, constitutional right to use and possess
marijuana. I do not aim to resolve precisely what protections such a right would
entail beyond that it would protect against a criminal conviction and sanction.
The right could also protect against other burdens on use and possession,
particularly civil bans and sanctions. At the same time, I do not propose that it
would necessarily protect against all such burdens, for example, taxes or even
criminal prohibitions on marijuana purchases and sales.
53. An excellent source on the United States history of marijuana
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have already been well-told in great detail and need not be
repeated with as much detail here. For present purposes, an
outline of the history of criminalization is relevant, along with the
story of modern-day deterioration in marijuana criminalization
and the path that the likely collapse will follow in the next few
years.
A. The Past
Marijuana was not always criminalized or even regulated in
the United States.54 The hemp plant, also known as marijuana or
cannabis, was legally grown as a source of fiber in the United
States beginning in the early seventeenth century55 but was
largely displaced for that purpose in the late 1800s in favor of
cotton or imported jute.56 By the mid-1800s, the plant remained
legal in the U.S. and was used for medicinal purposes on a small
scale.57 “[T]here is evidence that George Washington cultivated it
at Mount Vernon for that purpose.”58 Until 1937, “it was [also] a
prescription drug, listed in the official Pharmacopoeia of the
United States of American as Extractum Cannabis, and was
available from both large drug companies and vendors of patent
medicines.”59 It was also used recreationally in the form of hashish
by the well-off in some American cities.60 However, the practice of
prohibition through the early 1970s is RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H.
WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA
PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES (1974). For a good, short summary of the
United States history of marijuana prohibition from the early 1970s through
2016, see Bonnie, supra note 5, at 576–90.
54. See Smith, supra note 18, at 101 (noting that marijuana was not a crime
in most states until 1937).
55. See id. (“The settlers of Jamestown planted the first crop in 1611 at the
behest of Kings James I, who wanted hemp to be made into rope for the British
navy.”).
56. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 1–3 (noting that hemp
cultivation fell into disuse because of the importation of Indian jute and the
difficulty of cultivating the plant as compared to cotton).
57. See id. at 4 (reporting that the health benefits of cannabis were recited
in medical journals and sold at a pharmacy in Poughkeepsie, New York).
58. Smith, supra note 18, at 101.
59. Id. (citing COMM. OF REVISION, U.S. PHARMACOPOEIAL CONVENTION, THE
PHARMACOPOEIA OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 155 (11th ed. 1936)).
60. See LARRY SLOMAN, REEFER MADNESS 22–28 (1979) (recounting the
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smoking marijuana entered the country through immigrants from
Mexico and the West Indies around 1900.61
In the subsequent quarter-century, “criminal prohibitions
appeared on the statute books of nearly every state where the drug
was used,”62 mostly in the South, the Southwest, and the West.63
By the mid-1930s, twenty-two states had criminalized its sale or
possession.64 These laws stemmed largely from racism and concern
that use would spread.65 Criminalizing states still appreciated the
therapeutic benefits of marijuana, as the criminalization statutes
during that period did not proscribe its medical use.66 Nonetheless,
stories circulated “of violent rampages by Spanish-speaking aliens
crazed by marijuana,” and there apparently was a “substitution in
the public mind of the effects” of other drugs that many people
knew about, “like morphine and cocaine, for the effects of
marijuana, since the actual properties of marijuana were generally
unknown.”67
Well into the 1930s, the federal government did not regulate
marijuana,68 although it prohibited narcotics, such as opiates and
experiences of two early American upper-class explorers of recreational
marijuana use in New York City).
61. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 32 (discussing the
introduction of marijuana smoking in the United States “in the early years of the
twentieth century . . . by Mexicans and West Indians”).
62. Id.
63. See id. at 37–38 (discussing the evolution of state laws in New Mexico,
California, Louisiana, and Utah, among others).
64. Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread II, Forbidden Fruit and the
Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana
Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 971, 1010 (1970).
65. See Mandiberg, supra note 11, at 24–25 (examining the association
between “Mexican immigrants and other ‘marginal’ populations” use of marijuana
and its criminalization); Sean Hogan, Race, Ethnicity, and Early U.S. Drug
Policy, in 1 THE PRAEGER INTERNATIONAL COLLECTION ON ADDICTION: FACES OF
ADDICTION, THEN AND NOW 37, 46–49 (Angela Browne-Miller ed., 2009) (noting the
link between Mexican immigrants’ introduction of marijuana to the U.S. and a
concern that their use would spread from rural, farm areas to big cities).
66. See Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 64, at 1026 (“[N]ational policy was
steadfastly opposed to manufacture, sale and consumption of narcotics and
alcohol except for medical purposes.”).
67. JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO
ABOUT IT 23–24 (2001).
68. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 32 (“[T]he story of
marihuana policy in the United States begins as a series of distinctly local tales.”).
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cocaine, along with alcohol.69 However, Harry J. Anslinger,
Commissioner of the federal Bureau of Narcotics, “took an active
role” during that era in spreading “fear and misinformation” about
marijuana in the effort to secure criminalization by more states
and by the federal government.70 The Bureau collaborated, for
example, in the production of the 1936 movie, Reefer Madness,
which conveyed the view that “one puff of pot can lead clean-cut
teenagers down the road to insanity, criminality, and death.”71 The
effort to convince Congress succeeded with the passage of the
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937.72
The 1937 statute73 only criminalized the “non-medical and
unlicensed possession or sale of marijuana,”74 but “the net effect
was that simple possession now became a federal crime.”75 In
theory, the statute acknowledged the valid medical uses of
marijuana, because it “provided for medical doctors and others to
prescribe it, druggists to dispense it, and others to grow, import,
and manufacture it, as long as each of those parties paid a small
licensing fee.”76 But there was “a cumbersome bureaucratic
process” and an “exorbitant tax” that made even medical use
prohibitive.77 At the same time, “all nonmedical transfers,
whatever the amount, circumstance or geographical nature,”

69. Those substances had begun to be criminalized at the state level in the
second half of the 19th century and at the federal level in the early 1900s. See id.
at 13–31 (providing a history and chronology of marijuana criminalization). The
manufacture, sale and transportation of alcohol (but not possession) was
prohibited by the Eighteenth Amendment beginning in January, 1920, see id. at
25, until its repeal by the Twenty-first Amendment in December, 1933. See TERRY
L. JORDAN, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND FASCINATING FACTS ABOUT IT 53 (7th ed.
2007) (setting forth the language of the 21st Amendment and noting that it was
ratified on December 5, 1933).
70. GRAY, supra note 67, at 24.
71. Id.
72. Ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1970).
73. Shortly before repeal and replacement of the Act by Congress in 1970,
the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in substantial part because it
compelled persons to expose themselves to a “real and appreciable risk” of
self-incrimination. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 16 (1969).
74. GRAY, supra note 67, at 25.
75. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 175.
76. GRAY, supra note 67, at 25.
77. Id.
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became federal crimes.78 The effect was to blanket “existing state
and local offenses with a coextensive range of federal offenses, all
of these governing the same conduct.”79
Over the next three decades, U.S. politicians generally
pursued a “get tough” approach to illicit drugs that lumped
marijuana together with substances like heroin and cocaine.80 An
exception was made during World War II, when, faced with short
supplies of fiber sources for producing materials essential to the
war effort, the federal government encouraged the production of
hemp by U.S. farmers.81 After the war, however, hemp again
became a prohibited substance without legitimate use, and
Congress repeatedly passed more stringent sentencing laws
against drug distribution and possession, including cannabis.82
The Boggs Act of 195183 and the Narcotics Control Act of 195684
exemplified the trend.85 In 1961, the U.S. government also played
a central role86 in securing the adoption by many nations of a new
international treaty—the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs—
to prohibit the production and supply of a variety of substances,
including cannabis.87 In part to comply with that treaty,88
78. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 175.
79. Id.
80. See GRAY, supra note 67, at 27 (discussing drug scheduling of marijuana).
81. See id. at 26 (addressing exceptions made for marijuana used for hemp
fibers).
82. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 204–21 (detailing the
increased use of narcotics and, as a result, the escalation of penalties for
marihuana throughout the 1950s).
83. Ch. 666, 65 Stat. 767 (1951) (repealed 1970).
84. Ch. 629, 70 Stat. 570 (1957) (repealed 1970).
85. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 206–21 (discussing how the
Boggs Act “marked a significant shift in the rationale for marihuana’s illegal
status”).
86. See WELLS C. BENNETT & JOHN WALSH, MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION IS AN
OPPORTUNITY TO MODERNIZE INTERNATIONAL DRUG TREATIES 18 (2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CEPMMJLegalizationv4.pdf
(describing the United States as “a—if not the—key protagonist”).
87. See GRAY, supra note 67, at 27 (noting that “the U.S. government
somehow convinced many other countries to ratify” the treaty); BENNETT &
WALSH, supra note 86, at 2 (discussing the implementation of the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs by the 1970 Controlled Substances Act).
88. See BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 86, at 6 n.10 (“[C]ertain treaties
require legislation before they can be enforced domestically. The United States
passed, and subsequently enforced, just such legislation in the form of the CSA.”).
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Congress also passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970.89 “[C]ommonly known as the Controlled
Substances Act,”90 Title II, which is still in effect, “explicitly
prohibits the cultivation, distribution and possession of marijuana
throughout the United States.”91 There is no exception for medical
use.92 In the statute, marijuana is a schedule I drug, along with
substances such as heroin and cocaine, reflecting a conclusion that
it has “no currently accepted medical use.”93
Despite the passage of the 1970 federal statute, marijuana
criminalization began unraveling during the following decade.94
The original consensus favoring criminalization had rested on
three conditions: (1) the widespread belief that use of marijuana
led to abuse and ultimately to “mental deterioration, psychosis and
violent crime;”95 (2) the view that it was used “primarily by
insulated ethnic minorities, Mexicans and blacks;”96 and (3) a
widespread ideological preference in the country for cultural
homogeneity, fostered by “[t]wo world wars, the depression,
Bennett & Walsh note that the Controlled Substances Act is important in
fulfilling the United States’ obligations regarding marijuana under several
treaties:
[The CSA] law also implements three drug control treaties to which the
United States is a party: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
as Amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic
Substances, and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The first limits the use of
marijuana “exclusively to medical and scientific purposes,” among
other things; the third requires states to criminalize nearly all forms
of marijuana activity, again apart from the medical and scientific.
Id. at 2. However, as this discussion reveals, there is no obligation under the
treaties that marijuana be classified as a Schedule I drug, with no current medical
use.
89. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
90. Mandiberg, supra note 11, at 30.
91. BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 86, at 2.
92. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B) (2012) (“The drug or other substance has no
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.”).
93. Id.
94. See Bonnie, supra note 5, at 578 (“The gradual unraveling of marijuana
prohibition began in the late 60s, but the signal event was the Commission report
in 1972 . . . .”).
95. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 222.
96. Id.
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several recessions, the Korean conflict and a cold war,” that
resulted in “little tolerance for personal deviance” and legislative
tendencies to try to “compel sexual, sensual, and even intellectual
orthodoxy.”97 All three of those conditions “wobbled and fell away”
during the 1960s, as marijuana became widely popular among an
expanded group of users, especially university populations.98 As a
consequence, pressure for legislative change surfaced and
ultimately resulted in the creation of a bipartisan National
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse in early 197199 that
produced a somewhat surprising report the following year favoring
“decriminalization” of possession of “up to an ounce” and “other
consumption-related” activities.100 While Congress did not follow
the recommendation, “[b]etween 1973 and 1977, eleven states
decriminalized marijuana in response to the Commission
report.”101
Although the collapse of marijuana prohibition appeared
inevitable at that point, “progress came to a sudden halt at the end
of the [19]70s.”102 There was widespread concern that adolescent
use had increased, and Nancy Reagan, as First Lady, soon
promoted a “just say no” campaign against drug use.103 Due largely
to the crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s that also brought on
increased violent crime, a new “drug war” was also “initiated
during the Reagan period and intensified during the George H.W.
Bush presidency.”104 The result was a series of harsh drug statutes
passed by Congress during the late 1980s and early 1990s.105 For
97. Id. at 223.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 255 (“[T]he House version of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act provided for a bipartisan National Commission on
Marihuana and Drug Abuse to be composed of thirteen members, nine to be
appointed by the president and four by the Congress.”).
100. Bonnie, supra note 5, at 578.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 584.
103. See id. at 585 (“[T]he parents’ insistence on criminalization prevailed and
marijuana law reform came to a halt. This perspective was later embraced by
Nancy Reagan under the rubric of ‘just say no,’ . . . .”).
104. Id. at 585.
105. See GRAY, supra note 67, at 27–28 (“U.S. presidents and Congress have
continually reaped political benefits by passing a flood of ‘get tough’ laws, which
lump all illegal substances together regardless of their properties or effects on the
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example, “[t]he 1998 Higher Education Act disqualified young
people from receiving federal aid for college if they had ever been
convicted of marijuana possession, even though no such
disqualification applie[d] to convictions of offenses like robbery,
rape, or manslaughter.”106 One leading scholar concluded that drug
policy at that time “entered a very dark and regressive period, for
which we continue to pay a very heavy price.”107
B. The Present
The modern deterioration of the marijuana prohibition began
with states’ legalization of marijuana for medical use.108 The first
such law was California’s Compassionate Use Act in 1996, the
product of a voter initiative.109 The act reflected widespread
awareness among California voters that marijuana has several
important therapeutic uses, a view now confirmed by scientific
evidence.110 Since passage of the California initiative, twenty-eight
user.”).
106. Id.
107. Bonnie, supra note 5, at 586.
108. See id. at 588 (“[T]he states’ legalization of access to marijuana for
medical use, starting with California’s Compassionate Use Act in 1996, has
played a critically important role in the impending collapse of the prohibition
against recreational use.”).
109. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 215 (West 1996) (codified as amended at CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (2009)).
110. In January 2017, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine issued a report on the health effects of recreational and therapeutic
cannabis use, based on a review of scientific research published since 1999. See
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF CANNABIS AND
CANNABINOIDS: THE CURRENT STATE OF EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
RESEARCH REPORT HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2017), http://nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/
media/Files/Report%20Files/2017/Cannabis-Health-Effects/Cannabis-report-highli
ghts.pdf (reviewing the most recent evidence regarding health effects associated
with cannabis). The report identified conclusive or substantial evidence that
cannabis or cannabinoids are effective for treating chronic pain in adults,
chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting, and multiple sclerosis spasticity
symptoms. The report also identified moderate evidence that cannabis or
cannabinoids are effective for treating sleep disturbance associated with various
causes. In addition, the report identified limited evidence that cannabis or
cannabinoids are effective for treating decreasing weight loss associated with
HIV/AIDS, symptoms of Tourette syndrome, anxiety symptoms in persons with
social anxiety disorder and symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder. At the
same time, the report noted that conclusive evidence regarding the short-term
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more states, the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico have
also enacted laws legalizing marijuana for medical use.111
The movement to legalize cannabis for medical use created
“political, social, and economic conditions that were conducive” to
decriminalization and, ultimately, legalization for recreational
use.112 Several other social factors also spurred this movement,
including the “growing political influence” of generations that have
used marijuana with little ill effects,113 an increasing “libertarian
ascendancy,”114 and public opposition to “excesses in criminal
justice policy” and to the “heavy costs of the drug war.”115 However,
marijuana also became legitimized in a sense by the medical-use
laws.116 Governments that continued to criminalize it without
regard to its therapeutic value lost credibility on the separate issue
of whether marijuana could pose risks to health if unregulated.117
The credibility problem continues to apply not only regarding the
states that have failed to allow for medical use but at the federal
level as well.118 Congress continues to classify cannabis as a
Schedule I drug in the federal Controlled Substances Act, with no
exception for medical use, based on a purported conclusion that it

and long-term health effects, positive and negative, of cannabis use remains
elusive and warrants further study.
111. See NCSL, State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 5 (listing states
that have allowed for the medical use of marijuana).
112. Bonnie, supra note 6, at 588.
113. See JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA
LEGALIZATION: INSIGHTS FOR VERMONT AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS 3 (2015),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR864.readonline.html [hereinafter
CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION] (“One factor is
generational turnover leading to a rise in the proportion of the adult population
who have direct personal experience with marijuana; those who have used
previously are more likely than those who have not to support legalization.”).
114. Bonnie, supra note 5, at 589.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 588 (“[T]he states’ legalization of access to marijuana for
medical use, starting with California’s Compassionate Use Act in 1996, has
played a critically important role in the impending collapse of the prohibition
against recreational use.”).
117. See id. at 588 (discussing the IOM report in 1999 that bolstered political
momentum for allowing medical marijuana use).
118. See id. at 588–89 (“If federal policymakers had been sensible, they would
have facilitated lawful access for compassionate use in a tightly controlled
system.”).
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has no accepted medical value.119 This view long ago ceased to be,
if it ever was, plausible.120
Thirteen states have now decriminalized cannabis for
recreational use, and eight more plus the District of Columbia have
now legalized it, within limits, for those purposes.121
Decriminalization connotes a variety of forms of liberalized
prohibition, and, on this score, states that have only
decriminalized vary.122 Some make possession of small amounts
only a civil infraction, while some make such possession a
low-grade misdemeanor that carries no possible jail time.123 The
unifying characteristic among the decriminalizing states is that,
while not a state crime, the possession of even small amounts is
still prohibited.124
The eight states plus the District of Columbia that have now
completely legalized some marijuana-related activities for
recreational purposes account for twenty-one percent of the U.S
population.125 Colorado and Washington were the first to legalize,
in 2012, followed by Alaska, Oregon and the District of Columbia
in 2014.126 Voters in California, Maine, Massachusetts and Nevada
approved legalization in November, 2016.127
119. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text (discussing the
implementation of the Controlled Substances Act).
120. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005) (describing the medical uses
of marijuana). In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Congress had
the authority to prohibit the possession and use of even small amounts of
marijuana under its authority under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 42.
121. See NCSL Marijuana Overview, supra note 3 (detailing the legalization
of marijuana in certain states).
122. See id. (“Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have
decriminalized small amounts of marijuana.”).
123. See id. (“[C]ertain small, personal-consumption amounts are a civil or
local infraction, not a state crime (or are a lowest misdemeanor with no possibility
of jail time).”).
124. See id. (“[P]ossession or transfer without remuneration of one ounce or
less of marijuana [is] a civil violation.”).
125. See Eli McVey, Map: The Post-Election U.S. Marijuana Landscape,
MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Nov. 14, 2016), https://mjbizdaily.com/chart-majority-of-us-embraces-legal-marijuana/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2018) (“21% of the U.S.
population lives in states with adult-use laws.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
126. See NCSL Marijuana Overview, supra note 3 (detailing the legalization
of marijuana).
127. See id. (detailing the legalization of marijuana).
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Because federal law continues to criminalize even mere
possession of cannabis in small amounts for any purpose, there is
tension between federal and state enforcement efforts in those
states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or even
medical uses.128 Some accommodations have been made by federal
authorities on a temporary basis.129 In 2013, the Justice
Department announced130 implicitly that it would not prosecute
growers, sellers and users in Washington and Colorado as long as
they strictly complied with the state regulations.131 Likewise, in
December 2014, and in succeeding years as well, Congress has
enacted a rider in appropriations bills that prohibits the Justice
Department from using appropriated funds to prevent states “from
implementing their own State laws that authorize the use,
distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”132 In
128. See BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 86, at 1 (“Two U.S. states have
legalized recreational marijuana, and more may follow; . . . Such actions are in
obvious tension with three international treaties that together commit the United
States to punish and even criminalize activity related to recreational
marijuana.”).
129. See id. (“Two U.S. states have legalized recreational marijuana, and
more may follow; the Obama administration has conditionally accepted these
experiments.”).
130. The announcement came in the form of a Memorandum issued by the
Deputy Attorney General, James M. Cole. See Memorandum from James M. Cole,
Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.justice.cog/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
(announcing guidance regarding marijuana enforcement). In January, 2018, a
few days after recreational marijuana sales began in California, Attorney General
Jeff Sessions rescinded the Obama-era policy, although widespread doubt
persisted that there would soon follow any prosecutorial crackdown on
commercial growers, distributors and sellers in legalization states. See Charlie
Savage & Jack Healy, Justice Dept. Shift Threatens Legal Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2018, at A1 (reporting the change in policy and noting that “Justice
Department officials would not say whether they intended to carry out a
crackdown and begin prosecuting . . . , or were instead merely trying to sow doubt
and slow growth in the semilegal industry”).
131. See BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 86, at 3 (“Essentially, growers, sellers
and users of marijuana could steer clear of the feds, provided they strictly hewed
to the Washington or Colorado regulations.”).
132. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014); see also Brooke Staggs, Medical
Marijuana Gets Reprieve from Feds in Spending Bill, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/01/medical-marijuana-gets-reprieve-from-fe
ds-in-spending-bill/ (last updated May 17, 2017) (last visited Mar. 6, 2018) (noting
that the amendment was included in appropriations acts in subsequent years) (on
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2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded
that this statute foreclosed, on a temporary basis, an effort by the
Justice Department to prosecute various persons involved with
medical marijuana businesses in California.133 Nonetheless, the
fundamental conflict between the continuing criminalization of
marijuana activities by the federal Controlled Substances Act and
the effort of certain states to legalize some cannabis-related
activities remains unresolved.134
C. The Future
The legal status of recreational marijuana activity in the U.S.
will likely continue to reflect major variances among jurisdictions
for at least a couple of decades. The rapid movement by eight states
and the District of Columbia toward limited legalization for
recreational use since 2012135 suggests that more states will also
legalize recreational use on a limited basis within only a few years.
Yet, there is not a strong basis to conclude that the movement will
promptly proceed toward legalization across the country.
Regarding even minor recreational marijuana activities, we can
expect a period in which most states have legalized but Congress
and a strong minority of states continue to criminalize.
The prompt spread of legalization probably will be throttled
some by the limitations on direct democracy in many states. In
every jurisdiction that has legalized to date, the source of law was

file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
133. See United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“If the federal government prosecutes such individuals, it has prevented the state
from giving practical effect to its law providing for non-prosecution of individuals
who engage in the permitted conduct.”).
134. One commentator has urged that the Supreme Court should review the
classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug in the Controlled Substances Act
under a “heightened scrutiny” standard, contending that this approach could
result in the removal of marijuana from the federal statute altogether. See Sandra
M. Praxmarer, Note, Blazing a New Trail: Using a Federalism Standard of
Review in Marijuana Cases, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 25, 48–51 (2017)
(“The same federalism principles that led to a heightened standard of review in
Windsor can be applied in cases challenging marijuana’s classification.”).
135. See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text (discussing state
legalization of marijuana since 2012).
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a ballot initiative.136 The initiative process allows supporters, by
securing the requisite number of signatures, “to bypass the
legislature” and propose laws that voters can approve directly.137
The possibility of a ballot initiative does not assure legalization for
recreational purposes; Arizona voters rejected such an initiative in
2016.138 However, the initiative process seems to provide a more
likely route to passage in many states than does the normal
legislative process. Several state governments have considered
bills to legalize recreational marijuana in recent years but none
have approved it.139 There may be a widely-held sense among
legislators and governors that legalization of recreational
marijuana is not good policy, but there may also be a fear that it is
not good politics. The ballot initiative provides a way around
resistant or hesitant legislatures. However, only twenty-four
states have the ballot initiative available to enact state laws.140
This limitation will mean that reform will have to go through the
legislature in most jurisdictions.
In states without the ballot initiative, there is still reason to
think that legalization of recreational marijuana will eventually
spread. First, all states allow for the “legislative referendum,”
through which “the state legislature ‘refers’ proposed legislation to
136. See NCSL, Marijuana Overview, supra note 2, at 1 (“No state legislature,
to date, has legalized recreational marijuana separate from a voter initiative.”).
137. HENRY S. NOYES, THE LAW OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 103 (2014).
138. See NCSL, Marijuana Overview, supra note 2, at 1 (“On Nov. 8, 2016,
voters in four states, California, Maine, Massachusetts and Nevada, approved
adult-use recreational marijuana, while voters in Arizona disapproved.”).
139. In May 2017, the Vermont legislature became the first to approve a bill
legalizing recreational marijuana, but the governor vetoed it. See Reid Wilson,
Vermont Governor Vetoes Marijuana Legalization, THE HILL (May 24, 2017, 1:47 PM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/334958-vermont-governor-vetoes-marij
uana-legalization (last visited Mar. 6, 2018) (“Vermont Gov. Phil Scott (R) has
vetoed legislation that would have legalized marijuana for recreational use,
delivering a blow to legalization backers who hoped Vermont would be the next
domino to fall.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
140. The states that allow for initiatives are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See
State-by-State List of Initiative and Referendum Provisions, UNIV. S. CAL.
INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., www.iandrinstitute.org/states.cfm (last visited
Mar. 6, 2018) (detailing which states have the initiative and referendum process)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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the ballot for a popular vote.”141 Some state legislatures that are
unwilling to approve of legalization through legislation may be
willing to put the question to voters by authorizing a referendum,
and, in some of those states, voters may approve. Also, the
pressures toward legalization could well increase enough in some
states that state government will approve it through the normal
legislative process. In addition to the push from voters, based on
support for individual liberty, there might be some revenue
benefits to states that legalize,142 particularly if neighboring states
have not yet done so.143
There is good reason to doubt, however, that legalization of
recreational marijuana will soon extend to all states. Many
persons continue to believe that even moderate cannabis use is
risky and immoral.144 For example, the current Attorney General
of the United States reportedly believes that cannabis “is
dangerous” and that “[g]ood people don’t smoke marijuana.”145
Moreover, there are real risks associated with cannabis,
particularly when used by adolescents, when used excessively by
adults, or when used at times that might influence one’s driving on
the public roadways.146 Due to inadequate study, some of the
possible risks are also still unknown.147 Because the prevalence of
these concerns will vary among the states, we can expect some
141. NOYES, supra note 137, at 69.
142. For a discussion of the complex nature of the taxation considerations and
other possible revenue sources from legalization, see CAULKINS ET AL.,
CONSIDERING MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 113, at 75–100 (discussing the
ways in which a state might be able to keep revenue from marijuana sales).
143. See id. at 156 (noting that, if one state legalizes marijuana and other
neighbors do not for a number of years, the legalizing state could “generate a
substantial amount of revenues in the meantime”).
144. See id. at 27 (introducing moral arguments against the use of marijuana,
namely “concerns about the inherent rights and wrongs of using a mind-altering
substance”).
145. See, e.g., Sharon LaFranier & Matt Apuzzo, A Bond Over Bucking the
Establishment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2017, at A1 (noting that Attorney General, Jeff
Sessions, while a senator, said of marijuana, “This drug is dangerous,” and added,
“Good people don’t smoke marijuana”).
146. For a summary of the risks, see CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 113, at 31–38 (describing the health
consequences of marijuana consumption).
147. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 15, at 54 (“As
for research on the effect of marijuana use on employment and worker
productivity, the findings vary dramatically.”).
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jurisdictions to resist the trend toward legalization for a long
period and even continue to criminalize minor marijuana
activities.148
The federal government also will probably not legalize
recreational marijuana soon. First, there is no opportunity for
direct democracy because neither the initiative nor the legislative
referendum is available.149 Second, there are treaties in force that
Congress and the President would violate if they approved
legislation to legalize marijuana for recreational use even on a
tightly limited basis.150 The federal government would first have to
secure modifications to those treaties before it could properly
legalize, a task that could easily take several years.151 Finally,
there are political forces operating that would otherwise make
such reform difficult.152 Many federal legislators will harbor
reluctance, “given the political risks that will still attach to
marijuana legalization in many jurisdictions.”153 As long as many
states still resist, there will be resistance among many federal
legislators.154 On this score, it is noteworthy that Congress has
been unable even to agree to move marijuana from Schedule I to a
lower level in the Controlled Substances Act to acknowledge that
it has therapeutic value.155 These considerations suggest that we
148. In Arizona, for example, voters rejected a legalization initiative in 2016.
See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of marijuana
legalization in Arizona). Even possession of small amounts, except for medical
use, remains subject to criminal sanction. See AZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3405(A)(1)
(2010) (“A person shall not knowingly: possess or use marijuana.”).
149. See NOYES, supra note 137, at 4 (“For the most part, the use of direct
democracy in the United States has been limited to state and local governments.
There is no federal recall.”).
150. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance
of the Controlled Substances Act “in fulfilling the United States’ obligations
regarding marijuana under several treaties”).
151. See BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 86, at 1 (“[The United States] and
other drug treaty partners should begin now to discuss options for substantive
alterations that create space within international law for conditional legalization
and for other policy experimentation that seeks to further the treaties’ ultimate
aims of promoting human health and welfare.”).
152. See id. at 22 (discussing how domestic politics would create difficulties
in reforming the treaty).
153. Id.
154. See id. (“Domestic politics will make treaty reform hard.”).
155. See supra note 91–93 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
permitted medical marijuana use at one point).
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can expect to see a period when Congress and a strong minority of
states continue to criminalize recreational marijuana even after a
majority of states have legalized it.
III. The Absence of Constitutional Protection for Marijuana
Activity Based on Clauses Considered Separately
This Part assumes that the scenario described at the end of
Part II will materialize and asks a traditional sort of constitutional
law question: Could persons charged with minor marijuana crimes
in states that continue to criminalize recreational marijuana
successfully claim a right to engage in the activity under any
constitutional clause considered individually?156 To make the
scenario more concrete, let’s hypothesize that the defendants are
casual, non-dependent users of marijuana charged based on
knowing and voluntary behavior—either use of marijuana in a
non-public setting or possession of less than an ounce in public.
Assume also that the maximum possible punishment is
incarceration for up to six months. Let’s also suppose that thirty
states plus the District of Columbia (but not the federal
government and the twenty other states) have legalized
recreational marijuana. In claiming a right to engage in the
activity, the defendants make alternative arguments under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Fourth Amendment,
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. Could
they prevail? In what follows, I explain why their arguments using
156. I do not view incorporation against the states under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of a right recognized under one of the
specific clauses in the first eight Amendments—here, either the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause or the Fourth Amendment—as clause aggregation,
although the view is arguable. If incorporation of that sort were viewed as clause
aggregation, it would, nonetheless, be a special form of it, for there is no
aggregation of harms or synergy of concerns occurring. Rather, incorporation
follows automatically based on Supreme Court decree. Long ago, the Supreme
Court declared that incorporated Bill of Rights provisions “are all to be enforced
against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same
standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.”
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964). The Court reaffirmed this
identical-application approach when it incorporated the Second Amendment right
to bear arms in self-defense. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 788
(2010) (concluding that a “two-track” approach is now impractical).
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this clause-by-clause approach,
presentations, would likely fail.

even

with

the

best

of

A. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Argument
Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,157 the
defendants should expect to lose because they engaged in
affirmative, voluntary conduct that society has not yet sufficiently
condoned. The Supreme Court has used this clause only once to
invalidate a conviction (as opposed to a punishment), in Robinson
v. California.158 However, that case, we will see, would not seem to
protect voluntary use or possession of marijuana.159 The Court also
has invalidated some criminal punishments (as opposed to
convictions) under the clause when a societal consensus has
developed suggesting that they are grossly excessive.160 However,
our defendants would probably also have a losing argument on that
score, given that we are hypothesizing that the federal government
and twenty states would continue to criminalize their behavior.
The Robinson case, in which the Court invalidated not just a
punishment but a conviction, involved illegal drugs, but laid down
a very narrow protection against prosecution.161 The Court
157. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
158. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (“We hold that a
state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he
has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any
irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
159. See infra notes 161–168 and accompanying text (detailing the Robinson
Court’s narrow protection against prosecution).
160. See infra notes 172–178 and accompanying text (discussing when the
death penalty and other punishments will be found grossly excessive).
The Supreme Court has also asserted that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause “prohibits the imposition of inherently barbaric punishments under all
circumstances.” Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010). However, there
is only one decision from the Court invalidating a punishment that arguably falls
into this category. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 99 (1958), a plurality of four Justices
concluded that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of loss of citizenship
as a punishment for crime. See generally id. at 103.
161. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (“We hold that a state law which imprisons
a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched any
narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there,
inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth
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confronted a state statute that California courts had construed to
criminalize mere addiction to narcotics—in Robinson’s case,
heroin.162 The statute could have been construed to apply only
where there was proof that the defendant had voluntarily and
illegally used the drug in California, but the trial court did not so
instruct Robinson’s jury, and the state appellate court agreed with
the trial court’s interpretation.163 In those odd circumstances, the
Supreme Court invalidated the conviction itself, because the law,
as interpreted, covered a mere status rather than culpable
conduct.164 Addiction could arise without any illegal use of drugs
in California, the Court noted.165 One could be addicted based on
use outside of the state, on use pursuant to prescription or on
merely being born to an addicted mother.166 Addiction alone, the
Court suggested, was like having “a common cold.”167 To
criminalize that status was cruel and unusual punishment,
whatever the punishment actually imposed.168

Amendment.”).
162. See id. at 660 n.1
The statute is § 11721 of the California Health and Safety Code. It
provides: “No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be
addicted to the use of narcotics, excepting when administered by or
under the direction of a person licensed by the State to prescribe and
administer narcotics. It shall be the burden of the defense to show that
it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of violating any
provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one
year in the county jail . . . .”
163. See id. at 665 (“It would be possible to construe the statute under which
the appellant was convicted as one which is operative only upon proof of the actual
use of narcotics within the State’s jurisdiction. But the California courts have not
so construed this law.”).
164. See id. (“The appellant could be convicted, [the jury] were told, if they
found simply that the appellant’s ‘status’ or ‘chronic condition’ was that of being
‘addicted to the use of narcotics.’”).
165. See id. at 666 (“California has said that a person can be continuously
guilty of this offense, whether or not he has ever used or possessed any narcotics
within the State . . . .”).
166. See id. at 667 n.9 (discussing how a person could have “innocently”
become addicted to the narcotics).
167. Id. at 667.
168. See id. at 667–68 (“Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual
punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”).
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While the Robinson case could invalidate governmental efforts
to criminalize certain conditions beyond drug addiction, such as
mental illness, leprosy or venereal disease,169 it would not protect
our hypothetical defendants. Knowingly and voluntarily, they
either possessed cannabis in public or smoked it at home
recreationally. That is affirmative conduct, not a mere status or
condition.170
Our defendants also could not likely prevail under the Court’s
decisions invalidating criminal punishments (as opposed to
convictions) as disproportional under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.171 Putting aside that those cases do not
support a right to engage in conduct, they also do not apply to the
situation of our hypothetical defendants for a separate reason—
the absence of sufficient evidence of a societal consensus condoning
their behavior. Except in the death penalty context,172 the Court
169. See id. at 666 (“It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history
would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a
leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease.”).
170. Even if they were heavy users, the defendants likely could not
successfully claim an addiction to marijuana of sufficient force to render their
activity protected under the Eighth Amendment. Only a few years after the
Robinson decision, in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the Court rejected an
Eighth Amendment claim that alcoholism could prevent the application of a
criminal statute that applied to public intoxication. Id. at 535. The Court
concluded that alcohol did not produce an addiction sufficiently strong to
invalidate the conviction of the alcoholic defendant for intoxicated appearance in
a public place. Id. at 535. Marijuana poses less addictive and withdrawal risks
than alcohol or heroin. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note
15, at 38–39 (comparing addition from marijuana use to comparable alcohol and
drug addiction rates).
171. See infra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the four situations,
besides Robinson, in which the Supreme Court has given substantive or
procedural protection based on disproportionality under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause).
172. For Eighth Amendment purposes, the Court has declared that “death is
different” from any other punishment that may be imposed in this country both
because of its severity and its irremediable nature, and, thus, that more
demanding requirements will apply. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
357–58 (1977) (rejecting procedure that allowed a capital sentencer to impose
death penalty based in part on information not disclosed to the defense); Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (invalidating statute that did not allow a capital
sentencer to reject death penalty based on mitigating evidence concerning
defendant’s character, record and crime). This idea is also implicit in the
invalidation of standardless capital sentencing in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 289 (1972) (“The unusual severity of death is manifested most clearly in its
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has rejected criminal punishments only in a few, extreme
circumstances under the clause.173 Those cases boil down to the
finality and enormity.”).
In the last four decades, the Court has repeatedly relied on the “death is
different” idea to invalidate a death sentence on procedural grounds that would
not apply in the non-death penalty context. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 112–13 (1982) (rejecting the death sentence imposed under a statute
interpreted by state courts to foreclose consideration of defendant’s emotional
disturbance and violent and tumultuous childhood); Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1986) (invalidating a death sentence where the sentencing judge
had declined to consider evidence of the defendant’s good behavior while
incarcerated and awaiting trial); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397–99
(1987) (overturning a capital sentence based on statutory interpretation by state
courts that the sentencer could only consider mitigating factors appearing on a
statutory list); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 83–85 (1987) (rejecting a
mandatory death penalty for intentional murder by an inmate serving a prison
sentence of life without the possibility of parole); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
340 (1989) (overturning a death sentence on the grounds that governing Texas
statute did not allow the sentencing jury sufficient opportunity to reject the death
penalty based on the mitigating evidence of retardation and childhood abuse);
McCoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 439–44 (1990) (rejecting the requirement
that the jury find mitigating circumstances unanimously).
On the substantive side, the Court has prohibited the death penalty on
proportionality grounds in five circumstances:
In 1977, in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) for the rape of an adult victim
not involving the taking of human life. Id. at 600.
In 1982, in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1987), against a felony-murderer
who did not intend to kill or actually kill, id. at 788, unless, as the Court later
made clear in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), he was a major participant
in the felony and displayed reckless indifference to human life. Id. at 158.
In 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), against a retarded offender.
Id. at 321.
In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) against an offender who was
under age 18. Id. at 578; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 857 (1988)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (prohibiting a death sentence for persons who offended
when under sixteen years of age, and the relevant capital-punishment statute
specified no minimum age requirement).
In 2008, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), for the rape of a child
victim not involving the taking of human life. Id. at 412.
The Coker and Kennedy decisions, involving rape, probably mean that the death
penalty violates the Eighth Amendment for all offenses against individuals that
do not involve the taking of human life. In Kennedy, the Court declined to address
whether the death penalty might still apply to “crimes defining and punishing
treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin activity, which are offenses
against the state.” Id. at 437.
173. In the non-capital context, the Court has conferred substantive or
procedural protection based on disproportionality under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause in four circumstances other than the situation presented in

812

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 779 (2018)

idea that the Court will on rare occasion invalidate what it sees as
grossly excessive punishment.174 Before reaching such a
conclusion, the Court has required objective evidence, which can
be legislation or its absence in other U.S. jurisdictions, revealing a
societal consensus against the punishment in the particular
context.175 However, the Court has never invalidated a
punishment in a context in which it is authorized by twenty states
and the federal government, which is the situation of our
hypothetical defendants. In those circumstances, there is not
enough assurance that the punishment is grossly excessive.
Granting the defendants protection under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause would also set down a precedent
with provocative implications. If the Eighth Amendment
supported a right to possess or use marijuana when twenty states
and the federal government still criminalize that behavior, other
crimes and punishments would seem in danger of constitutional
invalidation. For example, the death penalty could soon be at risk.
Currently, nineteen states plus the District of Columbia have
the Robinson case.
In 1910, in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), to invalidate a sentence
of hard incarceration and permanent loss of civil liberties for minor offenses
involving document falsification by a government employee. Id. at 382.
In 1983, in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), to reject a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole for a seventh, non-violent felony involving uttering
a bad check for $100. Id. at 281.
In 2010, in Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), to foreclose a sentence
of life imprisonment without parole for a non-homicide crime by a juvenile. Id. at
2030.
In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), and a companion case,
Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), to disallow a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment without parole for any offense committed by a juvenile, absent
special findings in the case of a juvenile defendant whose “crime reflects
irreparable corruption.” Id. at 2469 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573
(2005)).
174. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000–01 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that the controlling opinion concludes that the Eighth
Amendment contains a “narrow proportionality principle,” that “does not require
strict proportionality between crime and sentence” but instead “forbids only
extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime”).
175. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010) (explaining that, in
rare cases where the court infers gross disproportionality, it “should then compare
the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the
same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other
jurisdictions”).
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abolished capital punishment,176 and the trend is toward abolition
by more states.177 This movement poses difficulty for our
hypothetical defendants. They are probably less likely to prevail
under the Eighth Amendment if their success would soon seem to
require the categorical invalidation of capital punishment for all
ordinary crimes even when a strong minority of states and the
federal government retain it.178
B. The Fourth Amendment Argument
The defendants also would not prevail under the Fourth
Amendment, because they possessed a contraband substance as
defined by criminal law. To claim a Fourth Amendment right to
possess and use marijuana, the defendants would be arguing
essentially that the amendment’s command that searches and
seizures be “reasonable” categorically forecloses the police from
invading their privacy to find and seize marijuana. Indeed, the
claim would have to be even more extreme to provide a right to
engage in the activity—that the government could not use the
evidence to prosecute a person even if the person or another gave
it to the police voluntarily and voluntarily reported the crime! This
general sort of claim—that the Amendment protects certain kinds
of evidence from any police search and seizure—has some
foundation in old Fourth Amendment decisions of the Supreme
Court.179 However, given that marijuana would be criminal
176. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty
(last visited Mar. 6, 2018) (comparing states with and without the death penalty)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
177. See id. (demonstrating how seven states have abolished the death
penalty since 2007: New Jersey (2007), New York (2007), New Mexico (2009),
Illinois (2011), Connecticut (2012), Maryland (2013), and Delaware (2016)).
Among the states retaining the death penalty, four have also recently experienced
gubernatorial moratoria on executions, suggesting that they could also soon move
toward abolition. Id. These states are: Oregon (2011), Colorado (2013),
Washington (2014) and Pennsylvania (2015). Id.
178. For the argument, nonetheless, that given the dearth of federal
executions over a substantial period, the retention of a federal death should be
discounted in assessments of the continued propriety of the death penalty for
murder under the Eighth Amendment, see Howe, supra note 8, at 1427–28.
179. See infra notes 181–194 and accompanying text (detailing the early
search and seizure case law).
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contraband in any state that would prosecute the defendants, it
would not be the kind of evidence that would have been immune
from search and seizure as an historical matter.180 More
importantly, under modern Fourth Amendment law, there are no
categories of ordinary criminal evidence that are recognized as
immune from police search and seizure.181
Early cases in which the Court construed the Fourth
Amendment reflected a strong “libertarianism” that demarcated
“both the zone of constitutionally protected interests and the limits
on investigative authority.”182 The line began with Boyd v. United
States,183 in which the Court addressed the constitutionality of a
statute authorizing a judicial order to the defendant to produce
records in a proceeding for forfeiture of goods allegedly imported
without payment of duties.184 The Court ruled the order improper
and the records inadmissible as evidence.185 The records were
effectively immune from “a search and seizure, or, what is
equivalent thereto, a compulsory production . . . .”186 Any such
search and seizure “of a man’s private papers” merely for “the
purpose of using them in evidence against him in a criminal case,
or in a proceeding to enforce the forfeiture of his property” was
deemed unreasonable.187 The outcome would have differed, the
Court asserted, if there had been a “search and seizure of articles
and things which it is unlawful for the person to have in his
possession for the purpose of issue or disposition, such as
counterfeit coin, lottery tickets, implements of gambling,
180. See infra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing how there were no
protections in early case law for items the defendant was not entitled to possess).
181. See infra note 190 and accompanying text (stating the holding of Boyes).
182. Lawrence Rosenthal, Binary Searches and the Central Meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, 22 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. L. REV. 881, 888 (2014).
183. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
184. See id. at 618 (addressing the issue in the case).
185. See id. at 638 (“We think that the notice to produce the invoice in this
case, the order by virtue of which it was issued, and the law which authorized the
order, were unconstitutional and void . . . .”).
186. Id. at 622.
187. Id. at 622–23; see also id. at 626–30 (discussing Entick v. Carrington, 19
How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765), which purportedly helped justify the Fourth
Amendment, and concluding that “any forcible and compulsory extortion of a
man’s . . . private papers to be used as evidence to convict him . . . or to forfeit his
goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment”).
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[etc.] . . . .”188 But, Boyd’s papers were seized as mere evidence of
his offense, which was not acceptable.189 Boyd seemed to mean
“that items to which the owner has a legitimate right to possess
under the law of property are immune from search or seizure even
on a warrant or other compelling justification.”190
This view of Boyd was solidified in the Court’s 1921 decision
in Gouled v. United States.191 There, the police had obtained search
warrants for the defendant’s office and, on that authority, had
searched for and seized some of his papers, which were later
admitted against him in a trial for fraud.192 The Court held that
those actions violated Gouled’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment,193 because the government could assert no right to
the papers that was greater that Gouled’s.194 The Court noted that
the outcome would have differed if Gouled had possessed the
papers unlawfully, which would have been true, for example, if
they had been “stolen or forged” or were themselves fraudulently
executed contracts.195 But because Gouled’s papers were mere
“evidence” of his crimes, they were immune from search and
seizure when in his possession.196 The Fourth Amendment
188. Id. at 624.
189. See id. at 623 (describing how the evidence was obtained merely to use
against the defendant).
190. Rosenthal, supra note 182, at 889.
191. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 303 (1921)
It would not be possible to add to the emphasis with which the framers
of our Constitution and this court (in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, and in Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385) have declared the
importance to political liberty and to the welfare of our country of the
due observance of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution by
these two amendments.
192. See id. at 304–05 (discussing the material facts of the case).
193. See id. at 309 (“[Search warrants] may not be used as a means of gaining
access to a man’s house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making
search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal
proceeding . . . .”).
194. See id. at 309–11 (“The Government could desire its possession only to
use it as evidence against the defendant and to search for and seize it for such
purpose was unlawful.”).
195. See id. at 309–10 (discussing when papers may be obtained for
evidentiary purposes).
196. See id. at 309 (determining that search warrants cannot be used to seize
papers merely to use them as evidence in a proceeding against the defendant).
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prohibited the actions to secure them or their use at trial, although
the government had discovered and seized them pursuant to
warrants that Gouled had not otherwise challenged.197
While Boyd and Gouled underscore that some items once were
immune from searches and seizures, those decisions would not
have helped our hypothetical defendants even had they been
charged with marijuana possession or use in 1921. Marijuana is
contraband where its possession is a crime or civil offense. In those
circumstances, the government could assert a right to seize the
substance that would be superior to the possessor’s claim to it,
meaning that the immunity would not have applied. Boyd and
Gouled both noted that there was no protection as to items the
defendant was not entitled to possess.198
The Boyd and Gouled rulings also would not help our
modern-day defendants for a second, more fundamental reason:
The Supreme Court has abandoned the notion that the Fourth
Amendment renders some categories of ordinary criminal evidence
immune from police search and seizure.199 In Warden v. Hayden,200
the Court upheld the introduction in an armed robbery trial of
clothing matching that worn by the robber that was seized during
a search incident to arrest of the defendant in his home.201
Although the clothing was “mere evidence,” the Court found that
point irrelevant: “Nothing in the language of the Fourth
Amendment supports the distinction between ‘mere evidence’ and
instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband.”202 As for the
Boyd and Gouled holdings, the Court overruled them.203
197. See id. at 303 (“It was objected on the trial, and is here insisted, that it
was error to admit these papers in evidence because possession of them was
obtained by violating the rights secured to the defendant by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”).
198. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624 (1886) (describing how the
laws of the Fourth Amendment do not apply to things that are unlawful for a
person to have in their possession); Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309 (same).
199. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1976) (overturning the Boyd
and Gouled decisions).
200. 387 U.S. 294 (1976).
201. See id. at 296–97 (reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision that the
clothing items had “evidentiary value only” and therefore could not be admitted).
202. Id. at 301.
203. See id. at 310 (rejecting Boyd and Gouled by holding that, “[t]here is no
viable reason to distinguish intrusions to secure ‘mere evidence’ from intrusions
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The Hayden opinion reveals that, although our defendants
could correctly assert that marijuana criminalization has
increased the number and the intensity of privacy invasions by
police, those facts imply no cognizable Fourth Amendment claim
for legalization. Doubtless, the sheer number of Fourth
Amendment challenges to searches and seizures involving
marijuana underscore the large role that cannabis plays in modern
search-and-seizure activity.204 Criminalization also has likely
produced invasions of privacy that are especially intrusive,
because marijuana can be possessed in tiny amounts,205 its
criminal use is “generally committed in private”206 and
governments intensified their efforts after the war on drugs
commenced to discover marijuana cultivation.207 Legalizing
marijuana surely would help ameliorate the number and nature of
the police invasions.208 Nonetheless, the Hayden opinion indicates
that a claim for legalization is not within the province of existing
to secure fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband”).
In Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), the Court also rejected a second
idea reflected in the Boyd and Gouled decisions—that the seizure of a person’s
private papers can violate a person’s Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298, 311 (1921). In Andresen, the Court upheld the introduction, in a trial
for fraud, of certain private papers seized pursuant to a search warrant of the
defendant’s law office. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 477. The Court clarified that the
Fifth Amendment does not prevent a search for testimonial papers that is
properly conducted under the Fourth Amendment, because there is no
“compulsion” in such a case. Id. at 471–77.
204. See, e.g., Mandiberg, supra note 11, at 31 (“Since 1970, the number of
marijuana-related search-and-seizure opinions issued by state and lower federal
courts has increased so dramatically that the task of reading them all is
overwhelming.”).
205. On this score, see supra note 19 and accompanying text (detailing how
small a “roach” of marijuana is); MIKOS, supra note 1, at 47, 76 (discussing cases
in which courts have applied marijuana prohibitions to tiny amounts of the
substance).
206. KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 42.
207. See Zeese, supra note 18, at 254, 260–61 (describing strategies taken by
the federal government to discover the growth of marijuana).
208. The reduction in police intrusions on privacy would not equate, however,
with the number of marijuana arrests or citations that occurred before
legalization. Professor John Kaplan once noted that the police “[v]ery
often . . . discover marijuana possession with very little effort.” KAPLAN, supra
note 18, at 364. He pointed out that “[o]ften young people, arrested or searched
on other grounds, are found in possession of a marijuana cigarette.” Id.
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Fourth Amendment doctrine.209 Although criminalization “does
enlarge the area of permissible searches,” the Fourth Amendment
limits those searches by generally requiring that the police have
an antecedent justification for any given intrusion, and, in some
cases, also judicial approval.210 The Amendment does not define
what is permissible evidence and certainly does not define what is
a crime.211
To grant the defendants protection under the Fourth
Amendment would also create a problematic precedent. If the
Fourth Amendment supported a right to possess or use marijuana
simply because marijuana criminalization produces many police
invasions of privacy, other drug crimes, for example, might also
seem invalid. Police searches for other drugs, including heroin,
cocaine and amphetamines, can also produce substantial and
especially intrusive invasions of privacy.212 Those other drugs are
substantially more dangerous than marijuana,213 but that would
have no relevance to the number and nature of the police
intrusions to find them.214 As a logical matter, constitutional
doctrine might also have to endorse the legalization of those other
drugs.215 This point only confirms that the defendants are unlikely
to prevail.
209. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (“The Fourth
Amendment allows intrusions upon privacy under these circumstances, and there
is no viable reason to distinguish intrusions to secure ‘mere evidence’ from
intrusions to secure fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband.”).
210. Id. at 309.
211. See id. at 310 (describing how the Fourth Amendment does not
distinguish between intrusions to obtain “mere evidence” versus intrusions to
obtain contraband).
212. These drugs share many characteristics of marijuana that make the
number and nature of police invasions of privacy to discover them especially
intrusive. See supra notes 205–207 and accompanying text (discussing the
characteristics of marijuana).
213. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 15, at 59
(discussing the risks of driving under the influence of marijuana compared to
alcohol).
214. See supra notes 200–207 and accompanying text (“[A]lthough our
defendants could correctly assert that marijuana criminalization has increased
the number and the intensity of privacy invasions by police, those facts imply no
cognizable Fourth Amendment claim for legalization.”).
215. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (presenting the Fourth
Amendment argument).
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C. The Due Process Argument
Our hypothetical defendants would probably also lose their
due process argument, although this one would present their best
chance of prevailing on a single-clause claim. The defendants
would likely lose because possession or ingestion of marijuana for
recreational purposes probably would not amount to a
“fundamental right,” and, thus, would not trigger close scrutiny of
the state’s purposes in criminalizing the behavior.216 On this view,
states could criminalize as long as they had a “rational basis,”217
and they could easily satisfy that standard. Marijuana use carries
enough small risks of minor harm to the user and others to give
states a rational reason to criminalize the activity.218 At the same
time, the defendants would have their best chance of prevailing on
the due process claim because the methodology for identifying a
fundamental right involves substantial subjectivity,219 which
leaves room for argument.
The Supreme Court has construed the Due Process Clauses in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to contain a “substantive”
element that safeguards certain liberty interests against state
infringement regardless of the process provided.220 The idea is that
216. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN D. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15.7, at 807–21 (4th ed. 2007) (reviewing the Supreme
Court’s fundamental substantive due process right jurisprudence and its use of
strict scrutiny).
217. See, e.g., Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176–77 (1978) (finding
that international travel, as distinguished from inter-state travel, was not a
fundamental right, so that only a rational-basis test applied).
218. See infra note 480 and accompanying text (reviewing risks of marijuana
use).
219. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 216, § 15.7, at 808–09 (“Despite
claims to the contrary, there has never been a period of time wherein the Court
did not actively enforce values which a majority of the Justices felt were essential
in our society even though they had no specific textual basis in the Constitution.”);
see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 10.1.2, at 829 (5th ed. 2015) (noting that, even under a test that looks to history
and tradition, the Court can manipulate the level of abstraction at which it states
the asserted right to make it either consistent with or unsupported by history and
tradition).
220. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)
(“Respondents’ . . . claim relies upon our line of cases which interprets the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantee of ‘due process of law’ to include a
substantive component, which forbids the government to infringe certain
‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided . . . .”);
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some liberties are so important “as to be ranked as fundamental,”
and consequently cannot be denied, unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,221 an often
(although not always)222 impossible standard for a state to
satisfy.223 The rights that are fundamental for this purpose are not
co-extensive with those specifically enumerated in the Bill of
Rights.224 The Court has determined that some enumerated rights
are not fundamental, such as the right to indictment by a grand
jury,225 and that some unenumerated rights are fundamental, such
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (reviewing substantive
due process).
221. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), abrogated in part by
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
222. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38–39 (1905)
(upholding state law that required vaccinations because of the government’s
compelling interest in deterring the spread of contagious diseases).
223. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, § 10.1.2, at 831 (noting that “the
government has the burden of persuading the Court that a truly vital interest is
served” and that “it could not attain the goal through any means less restrictive
of the right”).
224. See id. § 10.1.1, at 826 (“Almost all of these [fundamental] rights are not
mentioned in the text of the Constitution.”).
225. Enumerated rights in the first eight amendments that are not deemed
“fundamental” are not part of due process and, for that reason, do not apply
against the states. See id. § 6.3.3, at 525–29 (describing incorporation and listing
the incorporated rights, including provisions of the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth Amendments). As for enumerated but unincorporated rights,
the Court has never overruled its conclusion that the Fifth Amendment right to
indictment by a grand jury does not bind the states. See Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (“[W]e are unable to say that the substitution for a
presentment or indictment by a grand jury . . . is not due process of law.”),
limitation of holding recognized by Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994)
(“Hurtado held that the Due Process Clause did not make applicable to the States
the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that all prosecutions for an infamous crime
be instituted by the indictment of a grand jury.”). Also, while concluding that the
Sixth Amendment demands unanimous jury verdicts in federal criminal trials,
the Court has not incorporated this right against the states. See Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 370–75 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (finding that while
history demands unanimity among the jury in federal trials, incorporation of the
Sixth Amendment does not require unanimity among state juries). Some of the
provisions included in the first eight Amendments also remain unincorporated
through lack of decision, particularly the Third Amendment protections against
the quartering of soldiers and the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive
fines. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010) (“We have never
decided whether the Third Amendment or the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
of excessive fines applies to the States through the Due Process Clause.”). The
Ninth and Tenth Amendments also have not been incorporated against the states,
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as the right of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy prior
to viability of the fetus on its own outside the womb.226
In identifying unenumerated rights that rank as fundamental,
the Court’s modern approach, under Washington v. Glucksberg,227
has generally reflected great self-restraint, limiting recognition to
those rights “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.”228 This approach reflects an effort to avoid repeating the
sins of the Lochner era, in which the Court used substantive due
process to implement its vision of economic liberty.229 To further
the self-restraint,230 the Court also has generally emphasized the
apparently on the view that they only reaffirm that the federal government is one
of enumerated powers and reserve to the states any authority not given by the
Constitution to the federal government or denied by it to the states, and, thus,
could not plausibly limit the states. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 216,
§ 14.2, at 658 (“Under their own terms the Ninth and Tenth Amendments seem
inapplicable to the states.”). The Court has long hinted that it does not
contemplate incorporation for these two Amendments. See, e.g., Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (restricting commentary on the possibilities for
incorporation to the rights protected by “the first eight Amendments”), overruled
in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765
n.13 (omitting mention of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as among those
unincorporated through lack of decision, suggesting a view that they could not
plausibly apply against the states).
226. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (“[F]reedom of personal choice
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . That right necessarily
includes the right of a woman to decide whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.”).
227. 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
228. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (“Under these
circumstances, we cannot categorically state that pretrial detention ‘offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental.’” (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934))).
229. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (“There is no
reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free
contract, by the determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker.”),
abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also 2
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 216, § 14.6, at 673 (“The Supreme Court used the
substantive due process test to control a wide variety of legislation during the
period from 1885 to 1937.”).
230. The Court has also less formally articulated a third aspect of restraint,
which is that it is more likely to recognize a negative fundamental right (the right
to be free from governmental restraint) than a positive fundamental right (the
right to a government benefit). See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (“The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a
limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels
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need to provide a “careful description of the asserted right”—
meaning a description at a very specific level of abstraction—so as
generally not to “break new ground in this field.”231 Thus, for
example, in a suit challenging the detention of immigrant juveniles
pending deportation hearings, the Court carefully described (and
rejected as not fundamental) the asserted right as not a “freedom
from physical restraint” but rather “the right of a child who has no
available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and for whom
the government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a
willing-and-able private custodian rather than of a
government-operated or government selected child-care
institution.”232
Despite this general approach involving “utmost care”233 to
show restraint, the Court will sometimes identify a new
fundamental right. The notion that there is room for exceptions is
embodied in the assertion that the responsibility to identify
unenumerated rights “has not been reduced to any formula.”234
This idea takes precedence when the Court decides not to allow
“the past alone to rule the present.”235
While the Court’s approach to recognizing unenumerated
rights is easily manipulated to produce desired outcomes,236 the
recreational use of marijuana is somewhat different from the vast
majority of activities that the modern Court has protected with the
label, “fundamental.” Our defendants’ asserted right could be
described broadly as one of personal autonomy, or bodily
integrity,237 but there is a good chance that a court would instead
of safety and security.”); see also Yoshino, supra note 51, at 159–62 (discussing
this third, less formal aspect of the Glucksberg strictures). However, the right to
be free from the criminalization of marijuana-related activities is a negative right,
which means this point would not pose a problem for the defendants.
231. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
232. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
233. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
234. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
235. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
236. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (describing how abstraction
and subjectivity can be used to manipulate a due process inquiry).
237. See, e.g., Matthew J. Routh, Re-Thinking Liberty: Cannabis Prohibition
and Substantive Due Process, 26 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 145 (2017) (arguing
that “cannabis’ classification and prohibition as a Schedule I narcotic” in the
federal Controlled Substances Act “violates an individual’s fundamental right to
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describe it “carefully”238 as something like “the right to publically
possess and privately ingest marijuana to enjoy the benefits and
pleasure of its effects.” When described this way, the activity
appears self-indulgent. Use of marijuana is increasingly
understood to bring substantial enjoyment, even benefit, to a huge
proportion of the population. Indeed, shortly before any state
legalized recreational use, almost thirty million Americans
reported consuming marijuana in the previous year.239
Nonetheless, the activities the Court has protected as
unenumerated, fundamental rights generally have involved an
avoidance of a serious burden—such as restrictions on the right to
travel or migrate throughout the country240—or a liberty that also
involves an assumption of responsibility: the right to contract,241
the right to engage in the common occupations of life,242 the right
to marry,243 the right to procreate,244 the right to custody of one’s
children,245 or the right to control the upbringing of one’s
bodily integrity”).
238. See supra notes 231–232 and accompanying text (providing an example
of the specificity approach).
239. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 15, at 19
(writing first in 2012, “[t]he 33 million Americans who report use in the past year
far outnumber the users of all the other illicit substances combined”).
240. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (“The
constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the
highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so,
occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right
that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.”); Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 43–44 (1867) (codifying the fundamental right to move about
the country).
241. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (identifying the right to
contract, among others, as a fundamental right).
242. See id. (noting that “the right of the individual . . . to engage in any of
the common occupations of life” is protected under due process).
243. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987) (recognizing the
right even of a prison inmate to marry, although allowing the government to
infringe the right if the action is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interest); see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380–81 (1971) (recognizing
the right of indigent persons to fee waiver in judicial action to secure divorce).
244. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536–37, 541 (1942) (declaring
invalid a state statute that allowed judicially ordered sterilization of persons
convicted of two or more crimes of “moral turpitude”).
245. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (rearticulating the
basic right to “the companionship, care, custody, and management of [one’s]
children”).
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children.246 When considered against these kinds of activities, the
claim of our hypothetical defendants seems less convincing.
Their claim might carry more force if it focused on medical
marijuana use to relieve debilitating pain or symptoms.247 When
presented with such a case in 2007, after eleven states had
legalized medical marijuana, the Ninth Circuit rejected even
medical use as a fundamental right, but acknowledged that, as
more states followed California’a path, the outcome could
change.248 The Ninth Circuit was stark in its conclusion: “[F]ederal
law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical
marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate
excruciating pain and human suffering.”249 The Supreme Court
could easily adopt a different view on that issue now that more
states have legalized.250 As we have seen, marijuana has a long,
although interrupted, history of legalized medical use,251 and,
when consumed to relieve “excruciating pain and suffering,” it
becomes fundamentally important to one’s well-being.252
246. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (identifying “liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer, 262
U.S. at 399 (stating a right to “establish a home and bring up children”).
247. For an example of such a case, see Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850 (9th
Cir. 2007). There, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Raich’s use of marijuana
to treat the effects of numerous medical conditions was potentially necessary not
only to avoid intolerable suffering but to stay alive. See id. at 855
(“Marijuana . . . has proven to be of great medical value for Raich.”). One can
reasonably question whether recreation is any less important than treatment of
a medical condition or whether we can properly distinguish between recreational
or medical use of marijuana. See MIKOS, supra note 1, at 212–13 (noting relevant
commentary on the problems and asking those questions).
248. See id. at 865–66 (“We agree . . . medical and conventional wisdom that
recognizes the use of marijuana for medical purposes is gaining traction in the
law. . . . But that legal recognition has not yet reached the point where . . . the
right to use medical marijuana is ‘fundamental’ and ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.’”).
249. Id. at 866.
250. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (providing modern evidence
for the benefits of marijuana use that could support the recognition of a
fundamental right).
251. See supra Part I.A (reviewing marijuana’s history in the United States).
252. See Raich, 500 F.3d at 855 (“Raich has been using marijuana as a
medication for nearly eight years, every two waking hours of every day. Dr.
Lucido states that, for Raich, foregoing marijuana treatment may be fatal. As the
district court put it, ‘[t]raditional medicine has utterly failed [Raich].’” (citation
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Nonetheless, the vast majority of marijuana consumers are
recreational,253 like our hypothetical defendants, and the
conclusion that the Due Process Clauses should protect that kind
of use, even on a limited basis, is not as clear.
To confer a protected liberty interest on the defendants under
the Due Process Clauses would also set down a troubling
precedent. Avoiding any semblance of re-Lochnerizing the due
process inquiry is a serious concern for the Court.254 Yet, if the Due
Process Clauses supported a right to possess or use marijuana
because its use provides substantial pleasure, history and
tradition would have to be ignored. Recreational marijuana use
may have been legal before the turn of the twentieth century, but
so was use of much more dangerous drugs, like heroin and cocaine,
and all of those activities have now been federal crimes for many
decades.255 A court could try to draw various distinctions to limit
the precedential effect of a ruling that marijuana use is a
fundamental right. The court could emphasize, for example, the
lesser dangerousness of marijuana, the growing trend among
states to legalize its use, and the non-criminalization of other
drugs that are at least as dangerous, particularly alcohol and
tobacco. However, those kinds of distinctions have little to do with
history and tradition. Consequently, such a ruling could rightfully
be seen as significantly redefining the measure of what constitutes
a fundamental right.

omitted)).
253. See supra note 239 and accompanying text (outlining prevalence and
recreational benefits of marijuana); CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION,
supra note 15, at 19 (“20 million Americans say they’ve used marijuana in the
past month . . . About 7 million of those 20 million report using marijuana daily
or near daily, and more than 4 million meet the clinical criteria for marijuana
abuse or dependence.”).
254. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“[W]e decline the
invitation [to follow Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), as the standard for
interpreting the Due Process Clauses] . . . . We do not sit as a super-legislature to
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems,
business affairs, or social conditions.”).
255. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (recounting drug history in the
United States).
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D. The Equal Protection Argument

The defendants would surely lose their equal protection
argument if they lost their due process argument, because using
marijuana would not be a fundamental right and, further,
criminalizing marijuana activity involves no discrimination based
on a suspect classification or improper purpose.256 Defendants
might try to claim that the original criminalization of marijuana
in the early twentieth century was based on improper
discrimination, and, thus, that continuing criminalization should
be judged as improper. They might also try to claim that the
criminalization of marijuana use is irrationally discriminatory
when more dangerous drugs, particularly alcohol and tobacco, are
not criminalized. However, neither argument as the basis for a
constitutional right to possess or use marijuana would likely
persuade.
The Equal Protection Clause directs that persons in an equal
position should be treated equally.257 The command depends on
some external substantive standard that defines who is equal to
determine its operational value.258 In this sense, it is like a
command to treat people “fairly” or “justly;” it has little, if any,
meaning until the meaning is added.259 The Supreme Court has
tried to give the command some content through a few basic rules
that call for levels of heightened scrutiny of government action
rather than “rational basis” review.260 The first rule tracks an idea
that the Court also uses to try to give meaning to the Due Process
256. See infra notes 261–266 and accompanying text (listing the key aspects
of an equal protection claim).
257. See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (“The Equal Protection Clause
directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”).
258. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537,
543–47 (1982) (discussing the difficulty of defining equality); Bork, supra note 33,
at 11 (noting that “[t]he bare concept of equality provides no guide for courts” but
that “because of its historical origins,” the Equal Protection Clause “does require
that government not discriminate along racial lines”).
259. See Westen, supra note 258, at 547 (noting that once the external
standard is determined, the equality idea is “superfluous,” because the external
standard tells us all that we need to know about how to treat people).
260. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 216, § 18.3(a)(ii)–(iv), at 306–14
(outlining the three standards of review: rational-basis, strict scrutiny, and
intermediate scrutiny); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, § 9.1.2, at 697–98 (noting
that different classifications result in different standards of review).
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Clause—that government cannot impinge on certain persons’ (or
in a due process claim, everyone’s) exercise of a “fundamental
right” unless the discriminatory infringement is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest.261 The second focuses on
certain classifications of persons that the Court has identified as
suspect or the existence of a discriminatory purpose against such
a group. These include race,262 national origin,263 alienage,264
non-marital child status,265 and gender.266 Under this second
category of decisions, government discrimination against those
groups, either on the face of the law or through a law’s
discriminatory purpose and impact, will be subjected to either
strict or intermediate scrutiny.267 The practical import of these
doctrines is that where there is government action that interferes
with a fundamental right or discriminates based on a suspect
classification, the action will often be unconstitutional, while other
government sponsored discrimination is more likely to be upheld.
Having concluded that possession or use of recreational
marijuana is unlikely to constitute a fundamental right under the
Due Process Clauses,268 the same conclusion would apply for
261. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (state statute
that allowed judicially ordered sterilization of persons convicted of two or more
crimes of “moral turpitude” held to violate Equal Protection Clause).
262. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273–74 (1986)
(applying strict scrutiny test to racial classifications).
263. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (explaining that
classifications based on national origin are subject to strict scrutiny).
264. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (noting that strict
scrutiny applies to alienage classifications).
265. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (finding intermediate scrutiny applies to
discriminations against non-marital children).
266. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (finding that, with respect
to gender, “classifications must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”).
267. Strict scrutiny will require the government to prove that the
discrimination is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental purpose that it
cannot achieve through a less discriminatory manner. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (“[T]hey must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest and must be ‘necessary . . . to the accomplishment’ of their legitimate
purpose.”). Intermediate scrutiny will require the government to prove that the
discrimination is substantially related to an important governmental objective.
See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (articulating the intermediate scrutiny standard).
268. See supra Part II.C (reviewing the outcome of a potential Due Process
claim).
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purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court has
not differentiated in its determination of what is a fundamental
right under one clause versus the other.269 Because we have
determined that there probably is no fundamental right involved,
the rational basis test would apply. As we saw in the due process
context, the criminalization of even minor marijuana would meet
the rational-basis standard.270
Our defendants would also lose their equal protection
argument that marijuana criminalization involves a suspect
classification or an improper purpose to discriminate. Crimes
against marijuana use or possession involve no facially suspect
classification, because they apply to all persons. Our defendants
could try to argue that marijuana laws originated in the early
1900s based on an improper purpose to discriminate against
Hispanics and Blacks. However, such arguments would likely not
persuade courts in the modern era, because marijuana usage is
widespread among the races and the defendants probably could not
establish a governmental purpose to discriminate against a
protected group through the enforcement of the marijuana laws
today.271 In an equal protection claim against the federal
marijuana crimes, the challenger would also be hard-pressed to
persuade that Congress had a discriminatory purpose at the time
that marijuana was re-criminalized in the 1970 Controlled
Substances Act.
269. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (“[C]lassifications affecting fundamental
rights . . . are given the most exacting scrutiny.”); supra notes 227–235 and
accompanying text (describing how the Court identifies fundamental rights ).
270. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (describing the legitimate
interest states might invoke to satisfy rational-basis).
271. Evidence exists, however, that marijuana laws are enforced in ways that
produce racially disparate outcomes. See Smoking Marijuana While Black, N.Y.
TIMES (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/opinion/smoking-mari
juana-while-black.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2018) (discussing recent study
showing that, while “African-Americans and Latinos make up about half of the
population” of New York City, “they make up about 85 percent of those arrested
for low-level marijuana offenses”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Justine McDaniel, Black Adults 8 Times as Likely to be Arrested for Pot
in Pa. as Whites, Study Shows, PHILA. INQUIRER, http://www.philly.com/
philly/business/cannabis/black-adults-8-times-as-likely-to-be-arrested-for-pot-inpa-as-whites-study-shows-20171016.html (last updated Oct. 16, 2017) (last
visited Mar. 8, 2018) (showing racially disparate arrest records for marijuana use
in 2016, despite marijuana use being equal among races) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Our defendants also would not likely prevail on a claim that
marijuana crimes discriminate unconstitutionally against them
because alcohol and tobacco are legal.272 As we have noted, alcohol
and tobacco use are more dangerous in various ways than
marijuana use.273 The problem for the defendants is that this kind
of differing treatment by government of marijuana users versus
alcohol and tobacco users would only invoke rational-basis review.
Moreover, the governmental rationale for criminalizing marijuana
to avoid the dangers from its use would suffice to meet
rational-basis review even if this action implies that government
should also have concerns about the dangers of other legal
substances. The government need not attempt to solve all similar
problems in order to act rationally in trying to solve one of them.274
Claims by our defendants about unfair discrimination
between marijuana use versus alcohol and tobacco use would also
seem double-edged. If marijuana laws were held to violate equal
protection, crimes like polygamy, prostitution and bestiality would
also seem infirm. Those crimes also involve little risk of serious
harm to the participants or others. Unless those crimes are also to
fall, our defendants are unlikely to prevail.
IV. Aggregating Rights-Based Clauses
While no single clause could readily justify a constitutional
right to possess and use recreational marijuana even when a
super-majority of states have legalized it, proponents might
272. Professor John Kaplan expressed the policy argument for consistency in
the treatment of marijuana and alcohol by noting the reduced respect for law that
arises when marijuana is criminalized and alcohol is not. See KAPLAN, supra note
18, at 291 (“For a criminal law to be effective, it must . . . have a solid moral
base . . . . The problem with the argument that marijuana, though no worse than
alcohol, should nonetheless be made illegal, is that it abandons an appeal to
morality or to reason . . . .”).
273. See supra notes 22, 213 and accompanying text (presenting findings
showing that marijuana use is less risky than other forms of drug use).
274. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 512 (Alaska 1975) (“Assuming some
degree of control of marijuana use is permissible, it does not follow that the
political obstacles to placing controls on alcohol and tobacco should render the
legislature unable to regulate other substances equally or less harmful.”); cf.
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (asserting that government
can choose to move forward “one step at a time”).
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contend that aggregated clauses together would provide support. I
take a skeptical view, which begins in this Part with a critical
exploration of the basic validity of rights-based clause aggregation.
I acknowledge that there are Supreme Court cases that suggest
that sometimes two or more clauses can substantiate a right that
none of the clauses alone could validate.275 However, I hypothesize
that clause aggregation has not actually mattered in the Court’s
recognition of new rights under the Constitution. I also
hypothesize that clause aggregation (if it really matters) is such an
uncommon and unprincipled approach for rationalizing new
constitutional rights that we should view it as unimportant.
However, on both points I concede failure. One cannot disprove
that clause aggregation sometimes has carried influence in judicial
decision-making and that it has mattered often enough to suggest
some patterns in which its application might help justify new
constitutional rights in the future.
A. Supreme Court Endorsements
There is ostensible support in Supreme Court opinions for the
notion that two or more rights-based clauses in the Constitution
can come together to invalidate government action that none of the
clauses could disallow on their own. The Court typically has
declined to recognize multiple-clause rights,276 apparently taking
275. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (asserting
that the Court’s cases regarding the right to marry reflect a “synergy” between
“the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause”); Halbert v. Michigan,
545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (asserting that the Court’s decisions regarding access to
appeal by criminal defendants reflect “both equal protection and due process
concerns”).
276. See Coenen, supra note 28, at 1067 (noting that “the Supreme Court
typically addresses each of the relevant clauses in separate and sequential
fashion, taking care not to let its analysis of one clause affect its analysis of any
other”); Porat & Posner, supra note 27, at 51 (asserting that “outside these
[aforementioned] settings [of rights-based clause aggregation,], courts rarely
respond sympathetically to hybrid claims”); David L. Faigman, Madisonian
Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 661
(1994) (explaining that typical constitutional rights adjudication involves “an
individual balancing of each right against the interests that justify the
government action”). But see Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 1 (asserting,
based in part on the existence of tacit clause aggregation, that “[c]umulative
constitutional rights are everywhere”).
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the view in such cases that a failing argument under one clause
counts for zero and that adding one zero to another will not
increase the sum.277 But, the Court occasionally has seemingly
endorsed the approach by using two or more constitutional
provisions together to support the existence of a right or by
claiming that in past decisions this is what was really going on.278
This kind of clause aggregation to create a new right should be
distinguished from certain forms of aggregation that are
undoubtedly permissible and not at issue here. First, courts
automatically apply against the states’ rights that come from
certain “incorporated” clauses applicable against the federal
government by using the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.279 In such cases, the right already theoretically exists
in relation to the federal government,280 and, rather than being
created by the “joint interpretation”281 of two clauses, is merely
being applied in exactly the same way against the states.282
Second, courts can cumulate the harm to a litigant and thereby
grant relief based on a series of constitutional errors that
individually would be harmless.283 This action involves adding
277. For examples of such cases, see infra notes 410–413 and accompanying
text (collecting cases).
278. See infra Parts III.A.1–10 (reviewing aggregation with respect to various
rights).
279. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010)
(incorporating the Second Amendment against the states).
280. “Reverse incorporation” also amounts to a form of clause aggregation in
which there is no “joint interpretation” going on, which is dissimilar from the kind
of clause aggregation at issue here. Under reverse incorporation, the Court
applies the mandate of equal protection, explicitly applicable against the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment, against the federal government through the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
498–500 (1954) (“We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the
District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution.”).
281. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 9.
282. The Court articulated this same-standards approach beginning in the
1960s. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) (declaring that incorporated
Bill of Rights provisions “are all to be enforced against the States under the
Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those
personal rights against federal encroachment”). In recent years, the Court has
continued to endorse this approach. See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 788
(asserting that a “two-track alternative is now impractical”).
283. See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488 n.15 (1978) (finding that
the “cumulative” harm from combination of constitutional errors warranted
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harms from conceded errors, not creating a new right by combining
two clauses. Third, where a certain level of harm is necessary to
establish a constitutional violation,284 courts can cumulate the
harms to a litigant from a series of acts to establish a cognizable
violation.285 This approach also involves adding harms rather than
combining clauses to establish the right and its infringement.286 In
contrast to those kind of aggregations, we are focused on whether
“partial violations of multiple provisions”287 can establish a right
that would not otherwise exist. While a more controversial idea,

reversal of conviction under “the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness”
although none would individually warrant reversal).
284. Examples include violations of the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 682 (1984)
(finding that “the defendant must show that counsel’s errors ‘resulted in actual
and substantial disadvantage to the course of his defense’” to establish a
constitutional violation), violations of the due process right to have the
prosecution disclose material exculpatory evidence, see Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or punishment”), and violations of the Eighth Amendment
right against prison conditions amounting to cruel and unusual punishment, see
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303–05 (1991) (finding that state officials engage
in cruel and unusual punishment if they act with “deliberate indifference”
regarding conditions that deprive a prisoner of an “identifiable human need, such
as food, warmth, or exercise”); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)
(describing impermissible conditions that expose a prisoner to “an unreasonable
risk of serious damage to his future health”).
285. See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 8 (noting that “[t]he aggregation
of incidents of conduct when litigating Strickland claims has not been
controversial” but rather “has been understood as reflective of the cumulative
nature of ineffective lawyering at various stages of a criminal case”); Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995) (determining “materiality” of prosecution’s
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence by considering “the cumulative effect of
suppression”); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304 (noting that “conditions of confinement
may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would
not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces
the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need”).
286. While permissible and sensible, lower courts often have not aggregated
harms, particularly where they are of different types. For the view that courts
should aggregate the prejudice from all errors affecting reliability, see John H.
Blume & Christopher Seeds, Reliability Matters: Reassociating Bagley
Materiality, Strickland Prejudice, and Cumulative Harmless Error, 95 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1153, 1154 (2005) (noting that violations “are generally divided”
and proposing “that courts should consider the impact of . . . violations together”).
287. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 14.
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the Court arguably has sometimes endorsed such hybrid or
multiple-clause rights.288
1. Avoiding Compulsory Production of Private Papers
An early example of arguable clause aggregation by the
Supreme Court occurred in Boyd v. United States, a case
previously noted in connection with the Fourth Amendment.289 As
we saw, in Boyd, the Court found unconstitutional a judicial order,
issued in conformance with a statute, directing Boyd to produce
records in a proceeding for forfeiture of merchandise allegedly
288. To avoid unduly cluttering the text in this section, I mention here a few
more examples of arguable clause aggregation by the Supreme Court. The first
concerns ballot access. As Professor Michael Coenen notes: “The Court has struck
down . . . various ballot access restrictions as running afoul of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, citing to both free association interests and equality
interests as warranting a more robust set of limits on state laws that burden a
candidate’s ability to run.” Coenen, supra note 28, at 1080.
Another example concerns the right to travel or migrate between the states.
Beginning with Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), the Court has grounded this
right “primarily on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Coenen, supra note 28, at 1081 n.44. However, as Professor
Stephen Kanter has noted, the source of this right is “one of the better examples
of a composite/hybrid right that clearly reflects a Super-Penumbral or Whole is
Greater than the Sum of Its Parts approach.” Stephen Kanter, The Griswold
Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Rights, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
623, 639 (2006). Professor Kanter explains that “[t]he elements of this right come
from many sources,” including “the penumbral Dormant Commerce Clause, the
Commerce Clause itself . . . the First Amendment right to ‘petition the
Government for a redress of grievances[,] Equal Protection, the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, together with the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2, or with the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges or Immunities Clause.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
Various other arguable instances of tacit clause aggregation exist. For example,
Professors Kerry Abrams and Brandon Garrett contend that the right to effective
assistance of counsel, recognized in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984),
is grounded in both the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Due Process
Clause.
See
Abrams
&
Garrett,
supra
note
43,
at
31
(“[T]he . . . claim . . . vindicates both Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns.”). They note that the Sixth
Amendment text does not guarantee an “effective” lawyer and argue that this
aspect of the right is grounded in due process. See id. (“Th[e] right to effective
assistance of counsel . . . itself goes further than the Sixth Amendment
text . . . . This is therefore also an example of an intersectional claim . . . .”).
289. See supra notes 183–190 and accompanying text (discussing Boyd).
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imported without payment of duties.290 The Court arguably relied
on a combination of the Fourth Amendment and the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Bradley, for the majority, asserted that at least regarding
a compulsory production of a person’s “private papers to be used as
evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods,” the
“[F]ourth and [F]ifth [A]mendments run almost into each other.”291
Bradley identified “the intimate relation between the two
amendments” and concluded that “[t]hey throw great light on each
other.”292 He asserted that unreasonable searches and seizures
“are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to
give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is
condemned in the [F]ifth [A]mendment” and that the prohibition
on compelling one to be a witness against himself in a criminal case
“throws light on the question as to what is an ‘unreasonable search
and seizure’ within the meaning of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”293
The Court’s ruling in Boyd’s favor could be understood as declaring
the existence of a hybrid protection that rested on the two clauses
together.294
2. Avoiding Flag Salutes and Pledges of Allegiance
Another more modern but still early example of arguable
clause aggregation occurred in West Virginia State Board of
290. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626–30 (1886) (reviewing legal
canon to find that forcing one to forfeit “his private papers . . . is
within . . . condemnation”), abrogated by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
291. Id. at 630.
292. Id. at 633.
293. Id.
294. At one point, the Court said that the state’s actions violated each
provision, but, given its preceding discussion, could have meant that each took its
meaning from the other when applied to Boyd’s case, involving his private papers:
[W]e are further of the opinion that a compulsory production of the
private books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited
in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness against himself, with
the meaning of the [F]ifth [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution, and is
the equivalent of a search and seizure—and an unreasonable search
and seizure—within the meaning of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.
Id. at 634–35.
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Education v. Barnette.295 The case arose when two sisters were
expelled from a West Virginia public school for refusing to salute
the United States flag and to recite the pledge of allegiance.296 A
Board of Education resolution, prompted by a recently-enacted
state law aimed at fostering the “spirit of Americanism,” had made
such a refusal grounds for expulsion, among other consequences.297
The sisters were Jehovah’s Witnesses, and, believing the flag
salute and pledge sinful, challenged the state’s actions as a “denial
of religious freedom and freedom of speech.”298 They brought their
claims under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.299 The Court ruled in the
girls’ favor, declaring that a state cannot “prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or matters of opinion, or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”300 For
the majority, Justice Jackson made clear that the protection was
not limited to those with religious objections.301 The opinion gave
prominence to the First Amendment,302 although it cited no
particular clause as the basis for the ruling. Arguably, the support
came from a combination of several provisions.303 Professor
Laurence Tribe has described Barnette as resting “on no single
295. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
296. See id. at 630 (“Children . . . have been expelled from school and are
threatened with exclusion for no other cause [than refusing to salute the flag for
religious reasons].”).
297. Id. at 625–26.
298. Id. at 629–30.
299. See id. (“The Board . . . moved to dismiss the complaint . . . alleging that
the law and regulations . . . are invalid under the ‘due process’ and ‘equal
protection’ clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
300. Id. at 642.
301. See id. at 634 (“Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one’s possession
of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are held.”).
302. See id. at 642 (“We think the action of the local authorities in compelling
the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power
and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”).
303. The Court later described the decision as one of several that were
“decided exclusively upon free speech grounds,” but that “also involved freedom
of religion.” Emp’t Div., Dept. of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882
(1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1993), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).
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clause of the Bill of Rights but on the broader postulates of our
constitutional order.”304 The ruling perhaps could be viewed as an
example of tacit clause aggregation.
3. Accessing Post-Trial Proceedings by Indigents
Clause aggregation also arguably helped the Court to ensure
access by indigent litigants to post-trial proceedings. Due process
gives states great latitude on whether to provide for criminal
appeals.305 At the same time, equal protection typically allows the
government to impose financial requirements on litigants, since
indigence is not a suspect classification.306 Nonetheless, in Griffin
v. Illinois,307 the Court ruled that a state that provides for criminal
appeals of right may not condition appeals by indigent defendants
on their payment for trial transcripts.308 The rationale arguably
rested on the combination of the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause: “[B]oth call for procedures in criminal trials
which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and
different groups of persons.”309 Likewise, in Douglas v.
California,310 the Court found that a state may not require indigent
criminal defendants to pay for their own counsel on appeals of
right.311 In this case as well, the Court cited the ideals of both due
process and equality in support of the right.312 In subsequent years,
304. Tribe, supra note 36, at 26.
305. See, e.g., McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688–89 (1894) (finding that
the Constitution does not require the opportunity to appeal a criminal conviction
because “whether an appeal should be allowed . . . [is] for each state to determine
for itself”).
306. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[P]overty, standing alone
is not a suspect classification.”).
307. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
308. See id. at 18 (finding that as Illinois provides for appeals, “at all stages
of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect persons
[who are indigent] from invidious discrimination”).
309. Id. at 17.
310. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
311. See id. at 357–58 (finding that “[t]here is lacking that equality demanded
by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right,
enjoys the benefit of [counsel] . . . while the indigent . . . is forced to shift for
himself”).
312. See id. at 356–58 (referencing both maxims).
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the Court also looked back on those cases as ones in which due
process and equal protection converged to provide the right.313
4. Using Contraception
Probably the most well-known example of explicit clause
aggregation occurred in Griswold v. Connecticut, where the Court
identified a right of married couples to use contraception.314 Justice
Douglas, for the majority, eschewed reliance on the notion of
substantive due process so as to avoid any suggestion of
Lochnerizing.315 Instead, he found the right in the protection of
“privacy surrounding the marriage relationship”316 created by
“penumbras, formed by emanations”317 from the First Amendment,
the Third Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth
Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment.318 As for unmarried
couples, the Court later extended the protection through the Equal
Protection Clause.319

313. See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (asserting that
the Court’s prior decisions regarding indigent access to appeals reflect “both equal
protection and due process concerns”); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996)
(“We observe . . . that the Court’s decisions concerning access to judicial
processes, commencing with Griffin . . . reflect both equal protection and due
process concerns.”); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983) (asserting that
principles from the two clauses “converge” in the “analysis in these cases”); Ross
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608–09 (1974) (asserting that the rationale for Griffin
and Douglas was clause aggregation, “some support being derived from the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process
Clause of that Amendment”).
314. See id. at 484–86 (finding that with respect to a martial couple’s privacy,
“[s]uch a law [criminalizing contraception use] cannot stand”).
315. See id. at 481–82 (rejecting “the invitation” to use Due Process with
Lochner as a guide).
316. Id. at 486.
317. Id. at 484.
318. See id. (listing sources giving rise to “zones of privacy”).
319. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972) (“We hold that by
providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are
similarly situated, [the laws criminalizing contraceptive distribution, except to
married couples] violate the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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5. Viewing Obscene Pornography Privately at Home

In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court explicitly averred to clause
aggregation in justifying a right to view obscene pornography
privately at home.320 The Court had previously held, without
qualification, that obscenity is not protected by the First
Amendment.321 However, in Stanley, the Court created a narrow
exception that built on two previously recognized fundamental
rights, each purportedly also derived through clause
aggregation.322 First, the Court asserted that “[i]t is now well
established that” there is a “right to receive information and ideas”
that is grounded on two clauses in the First Amendment: the
freedom “of speech and press.”323 Likewise, the Court noted that
“also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s
privacy.”324 In support of this privacy right, the Court cited
Griswold,325 which, as we have seen, relied itself on clause
aggregation.326 The effect of the aggregation was both to support
the new right and to narrowly limit its scope.327

320. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (“We hold that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene
material a crime.”); infra notes 323–327 and accompanying text (reviewing the
Stanley application of clause aggregation).
321. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that
“obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press”).
322. See infra notes 323–327 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s
methodology).
323. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943), among other cases).
324. Id. at 564.
325. See id. (referencing Griswold, among other cases).
326. See supra notes 314–319 and accompanying text (examining clause
aggregation in Griswold).
327. The opinion was not always thoroughly transparent. In its statement of
the holding at the end, the Court said that “the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a
crime.” Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568. This was not entirely accurate, because the
decision was actually based on multiple clauses both in the First Amendment and
beyond. See supra notes 323–325 and accompanying text (detailing the actual
grounds, based on clause aggregation).
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6. Engaging in Intimate Associations
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,328 “the Court derived a
right of intimate association (such as noninterference in family
life) from the right to association in the First Amendment and the
right to due process in the Fourteenth Amendment.”329 The case
involved a Minnesota statute that aimed to eliminate gender bias
and that the Minnesota courts had applied to require a private,
national organization with thousands of members to admit women
to full membership.330 The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that
the organization was not the sort that involved intimate
association.331 However, in the process of recognizing the existence
of such a right, the Court noted cases decided under the First
Amendment and under the Due Process Clause that protected
various aspects of family life.332 The Court seemed to view the right
to intimate association as a hybrid-clause right.333
7. Engaging in Expressive Associations
The Court arguably combined clauses to recognize a right of
“expressive association” in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.334 At
issue was a New Jersey law that required the Boy Scouts to
readmit Dale to adult membership after the group’s leadership
328. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
329. Porat & Posner, supra note 27, at 50–51 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–
19).
330. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612–16 (addressing a conflict between the
State’s effort to eliminate gender-based discrimination and the freedom of
association of members of a private organization).
331. See id. at 620–22 (concluding that the organization lacked the distinctive
characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision to
exclude women).
332. See id. at 619 (“Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state
interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one’s
identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”).
333. See Marcum v. Catron, 70 F. Supp. 2d 728, 733–34 (E.D. Ky. 1999)
(interpreting Roberts as having acknowledged intimate association as a “hybrid
right”).
334. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (determining
that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s interpretation of a New Jersey public
accommodations law violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of
expressive association).
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dismissed him upon learning of his status as a gay person and of
his gay-rights activism.335 The Supreme Court rejected the
application of the New Jersey law to the Boy Scouts, concluding
that the group was engaged in expressive association and that one
of the group’s desires was not to condone homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior.336 Readmitting Dale to membership
would have unduly burdened the group’s expression of this view.337
This right of expressive association338 “might be taken as a hybrid
of the right to free speech and the right to association.”339
8. Acting on Religious Beliefs Connected with Communicative
Rights or Parenting Rights
In several cases, the Court has invalidated even neutral,
generally applicable laws based on the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with another constitutional protection, such as the
right of parents to direct the education of their children340 or the
freedom of speech or of the press.341 For example, in Wisconsin v.
335. See id. at 644–45 (“New Jersey’s public accommodations statute
prohibits, among other things, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
in places of public accommodation.”).
336. See id. at 648–53 (“Forcing a group to accept certain members may
impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that
it intends to express.”).
337. See id. at 661 (“[P]ublic or judicial disapproval of a tenant of an
organization’s expression does not justify the State’s effort to compel the
organization to accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the
organization’s expressive message.”).
338. The Court had previously recognized the right of “expressive association”
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 622–23 (1984), involving a
Minnesota statute that the state had interpreted to require the Jaycees to admit
women to membership. In Roberts, the Court had found that the state statute as
applied to the Jaycees narrowly served a compelling interest of the state and
imposed little burden on the expressive freedom of the Jaycees’ members. Id. at
623–29.
339. Porat & Posner, supra note 27, at 50.
340. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)
(determining that legislation that required children to attend public schools
unreasonably interfered with parental rights).
341. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304–07 (1940) (concluding
that a state statute that forbids any person from soliciting money or valuables for
any alleged religious cause is a previous restraint upon the free exercise of
religion and a deprivation of liberty without due process of law in violation of the
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Yoder,342 the Court invalidated compulsory school-attendance laws
as applied to Amish parents who declined on religious grounds to
send their children to public schools.343 The Barnette case, as we
have already seen, also arguably relied on both free speech and the
free exercise clauses, if not others as well, to invalidate a
compulsory flag salute and pledge of allegiance law when
challenged by religious objectors.344 In Employment Division v.
Smith345 the Court looked back on those cases, “in denying requests
for free exercise relief,” and “suggested that the Free Exercise
Clause might elsewhere operate ‘in conjunction with other
constitutional protections’ to impose a stronger set of limits than
what any single clause would impose on its own.”346
9. Engaging in Private Sexual Conduct
The Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,347 protecting the
right of persons to engage in intimate sexual conduct, including
with a person of the same sex, arguably reflected clause
aggregation.348 A Texas statute made it a crime for two persons of
the same sex to engage in “deviate sexual intercourse with another

Fourteenth Amendment).
342. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
343. See id. at 233 (“[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a
free exercise claim . . . more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the
State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”).
344. See supra notes 295–304 and accompanying text (arguing that West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) is an example
of tacit clause aggregation).
345. 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
346. Coenen, supra note 28, at 1071. The Smith decision has been criticized
for creating a “free exercise jurisprudence devoid of strict scrutiny except in
‘hybrid situations’ where free exercise claims are joined by colorable claims
arising under another part of the Constitution.” Ming Hsu Chen, Note, Two
Wrongs Make a Right: Hybrid Claims of Discrimination, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 685,
686 (2004); see also Coenen, supra note 28, at 1071–72 (noting that many
commentators have criticized the decision for a variety of reasons, including its
failure to explain how the combination analysis should function).
347. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
348. See id. (invalidating a Texas statute that made it a crime for two persons
of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct).
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individual of the same sex.”349 The Court, through Justice
Kennedy, decided the case under the Due Process Clause to make
clear that it was overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,350 a decision
seventeen years earlier in which the Court upheld a Georgia
statute that criminalized sodomy, whether committed with a
person of the same or opposite sex.351 By deciding Lawrence on due
process rather than equal protection grounds, the Court clarified
that even a facially non-discriminatory statute, like the one at
issue in Bowers, was no longer constitutional.352 Yet, the Lawrence
opinion also noted the equal protection concerns involved and
suggested that seeing the inequality at play helped the Court
understand the importance of the liberty interest of all persons to
engage in intimate sexual conduct.353 Justice Kennedy said, at one
point: “Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of
liberty are linked in important respects,” and he emphasized that
“a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”354 Because
Justice Kennedy also did not assert a “fundamental right,” but
nonetheless invalidated the Texas statute, he seemed to employ a
non-traditional analysis that rested on the convergence of both
349. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003), invalidated by Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 579.
350. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
351. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)
A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits
to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth
or anus of another . . . .
A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years . . . .
352. Professor Pamela Karlan had suggested this approach, based on the
asserted “synergistic” relationship of the two clauses, the year before in an article
published in the McGeorge Law Review, a journal associated with the law school
where Justice Kennedy taught constitutional law before ascending to the
Supreme Court. See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the
Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474, 485–87
(2002) (“[S]ometimes looking at an issue stereoscopically—through the lenses of
both the due process clause and the equal protection clause—can have synergistic
effects, producing results that neither clause might reach by itself.”).
353. See Lawrence, 539 U.S at 575 (“If protected conduct is made criminal and
the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma
might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection
reasons.”).
354. Id.
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clauses. Indeed, the Court itself later looked back on Lawrence in
those terms, asserting that the decision “drew upon principles of
liberty and equality to define and protect the rights of gays and
lesbians.”355
10. Entering Into Same-Sex Marriage
The constitutional right to enter into same-sex marriage also
seems to rest on clause aggregation. In Obergefell v. Hodges, the
Court invalidated statutes from several states that defined
marriage as a union between one man and one woman and denied
same-sex couples marriage licenses.356 In seriatim discussions,
Justice Kennedy, for the Court, referred to both the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause as the bases for the
ruling.357 Yet, he also asserted a relevant “synergy” between the
two provisions.358 Purportedly, this synergy also helped explain
several earlier marriage-right decisions359 and others, such as
355. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
356. See id. at 2593, 2608 (“These cases come from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio,
and Tennessee, States that define marriage as a union between one man and one
woman.”).
357. See id. at 2604 (“It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the
liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they
abridge central precepts of equality.”).
358. See id. at 2603 (“The synergy between the two protections is illustrated
further in Zablocki.” (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978))).
359. The Court pointed, for example, to Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
in which it had struck down Virginia miscegenation statutes that criminally
punished marriage between a white person and a non-white person. See
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603 (“In Loving the Court invalidated a prohibition on
interracial marriage under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause.”). Despite the Court’s effort to portray Loving as reflecting this dynamic,
the hybrid-clause nature of the ruling there was not as clear as in Obergefell. Id.
In Loving, the Court had declared the Virginia statues to violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. The Court then concluded that the
prohibition offended the Due Process Clause because it denied equality: “To deny
this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications
embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle
of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the
State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.” Id. While this language
suggested some inter-connectedness between the two clauses, the decision in
Loving was easily justified under the Equal Protection Clause alone, particularly
because the statutes were “designed to maintain White Supremacy.” Id. at 11.
Under that clause, a “racially discriminatory purpose is always enough to subject

844

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 779 (2018)

Lawrence. In Obergefell, as in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy shifted
the focus to the word “liberty” in the Due Process Clause and
contended that liberty was intertwined with equality.360 He
asserted, for example: “Each concept—liberty and equal
protection—leads to a stronger understanding of the other.”361 He
did not explain the interconnectedness at length in theoretical
terms. But, in practical terms, the importance of the combination
for identifying new constitutional rights was two-fold. First, it
arguably limited the precedential value of the ruling to cases
involving a claim for equal dignity by a group of persons who,
because of what Justice Kennedy described as an “immutable”362
characteristic, were previously subordinated, although they were
not necessarily within a “suspect classification” under equal
protection doctrine.363 Second, that limitation, in turn, enabled the
Court to avoid the “history and tradition” plus “careful delineation
of the right” requirements364 for identifying a “fundamental
right.”365 Because Justice Kennedy’s discussion under each of the
clauses incorporated these departures from the Court’s traditional
approaches, the ostensible influence of clause-aggregation was
readily discernible.366
B. Has Clause Aggregation Actually Mattered?
Despite the ostensible support in Supreme Court cases for the
notion of rights-based clause aggregation, one could plausibly
a law to strict scrutiny.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 600 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1976)).
360. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (explaining that the Court has, on
multiple occasions, confirmed the relation between liberty and equality);
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (same).
361. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.
362. Id. at 2596.
363. See Yoshino, supra note 51, at 174 (arguing that the antisubordination
principle constrains the precedential effect).
364. See supra notes 227–231 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s
approach to identifying a non-enumerated right that ranks as fundamental).
365. See Yoshino, supra note 51, at 162–66 (arguing that restrictions based
on tradition will be more difficult to invoke after Obergefell).
366. See id. at 162–66, 174–76 (explaining potential effects of the Obergefell
decision).
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question whether it has actually been outcome-determinative in
the creation of new constitutional rights. I hypothesize in this
section that it has not mattered—that the Court would have
created the same new constitutional rights by using single clauses
were clause aggregation deemed an inappropriate rhetorical
technique. Yet, I ultimately concede failure in proving this
hypothesis. While clause aggregation is under-theorized in the
Court’s opinions as a constitutional force, one cannot disprove that
it sometimes has influenced decisions to recognize new
constitutional protections.
1. The Hypothesis of Non-Influence
There are reasons to doubt that rights-based clause
aggregation has mattered in producing constitutional rights. First,
one could nitpick with some of the examples, such as Boyd,367
because it was later overruled,368 and Barnette, because the clause
aggregation there was especially ambiguous.369 But, putting aside
367. See supra notes 183–190 and accompanying text (explaining that Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), was an early case wherein the Court began
to examine “the zone of constitutionally protected interests and the limits on
investigative authority” (quoting Rosenthal, supra note 183, at 888)).
368. As we have seen, the Court later rejected the whole idea that the Fifth
Amendment privilege ever combines with the Fourth Amendment to protect
certain kinds of evidence from compulsory production or search and seizure in a
greater way than those provisions would afford protection on their own. See supra
notes 199–203 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court overturned
Boyd in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1976)).
369. While Barnette could have been based on multiple provisions in the First
Amendment and beyond, it also seems plausible that it merely reflected an
interpretation of the Free Speech Clause. On that view, the Free Speech Clause
would have to protect not only the right of persons to affirmatively express their
views but also their right not to be “forced to . . . make any statements when they
would rather be silent or express different views.” Leora Harpaz, Justice
Jackson’s Flag Salute Legacy: The Supreme Court Struggles to Protect Intellectual
Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REV. 817, 818 (1986). Justice Kennedy’s strategic
reference to Barnette in Obergefell hints perhaps that the ruling and its
descendants should now be understood as reflecting a more expansive right, some
qualified form of human “dignity.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606
(2015). See generally Tribe, supra note 36, at 26 n.73. Nonetheless, one could still
conclude that Barnette, while not resting explicitly on any single clause, was
simply a freedom of expression case until given a much broader meaning later.
See Harpaz, supra, at 20 (asserting that Barnette “was the first Supreme Court
decision establishing that the free speech guarantee also secures the right to
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those small concerns, the central challenge to clause aggregation
is that it is irrelevant. In all of the purported examples, one can
reasonably doubt that there is any aggregated or “synergized”
harm greater than that which the Court could easily have
acknowledged under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clauses. On this view, the use of multiple clauses was
simply a way to limit the precedent, something that could also have
been accomplished under a Due Process Clause with a bit of
nuanced explanation.
Consider the group of cases involving the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses—Griffin and Douglas along with
Lawrence and Obergefell. In these cases, the Court viewed the
individual interest at stake as highly important, whether or not
called “fundamental.” In Griffin and Douglas, it was the
opportunity to appeal a criminal conviction.370 In Lawrence, it was
the interest in engaging in intimate sexual activity.371 In
Obergefell, it was the interest of same-sex couples in entering into
marriage, which the Court actually characterized as
“fundamental.”372 Given the Court’s view as to the importance of
those interests, one could reasonably conclude that it would have
decided all of those cases the same way under the Due Process
Clause alone were clause aggregation deemed an improper
rationalizing technique. On this view, the emphasis the Court gave
in each of the cases to the vulnerable or subordinated experience
of the class of persons to which the petitioners belonged (the
equality concern) was primarily a way to limit the precedent. Only
indigents, for example, had a right to a free trial transcript and
government supplied counsel, not people who could pay.373 Only
remain silent in the face of a government effort to coerce expression”).
370. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956) (determining that States
must provide adequate appellate review to all defendants, regardless of their
ability to pay); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (same).
371. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (concluding that
homosexuals have the right to engage in consensual sexual activity in the home
without government intervention).
372. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (“[T]he right to marry is a
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of a person, and . . . couples of the
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
373. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18–19 (determining that States must provide
adequate appellate review to all defendants, regardless of their ability to pay);
Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355 (1963) (same).
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gay or lesbian intimate sexual intimacy was protected, not adult
incest or bestiality. And the right between two gay people to marry
was newly protected, but not the right of three or more people to a
plural marriage.374 While clause aggregation was convenient for
emphasizing the narrowing constraints, the Court could have
accomplished the same limiting effect merely by carefully
describing the boundaries of each holding under the Due Process
Clause.375
For Griswold and cases in which the Court combined
provisions from the First Amendment with the Due Process
Clause, the aggregation is also reasonably viewed as not crucial to
the outcomes. The Griswold use of penumbras from multiple
clauses to identify a “privacy” right has been harshly criticized for
a variety of reasons, including the failure to adequately explain
“how a series of specified rights combined to create a new and
unspecified right.”376 Yet, the fact that “almost no one believes that
the contraception decisions should now be overruled”377 implies
that the Court could have simply decided Griswold the same way
directly under the Due Process Clause. Likewise, cases in which
the Court recognized rights to intimate or expressive associations
or rights to religious exercise in connection with an associational
right could all have been grounded on the Due Process Clause.
“The process of aggregating rights merely asks the ultimate
constitutional question: To what degree has the challenged action
infringed liberty?”378 This ultimate question could have been asked
374. See Yoshino, supra note 51, at 177 (“[T]he antisubordination principle
likely provides a strong constraint on recognition of polygamous unions as a
fundamental right.”).
375. Suspicion that the Court would have done the same thing in the absence
of an Equal Protection Clause easily builds on the Court’s incorporation against
the federal government through the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause of
equal protections rulings promulgated against the states. See generally Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–500 (1954). However, such “reverse incorporation”
rulings, could also be seen as more essential in the Fifth Amendment context,
based on the need to hold the federal government to the same standards as the
states. See supra note 280 and accompanying text (“In such cases, the right
already theoretically exists in relation to the federal government . . . .”).
376. Bork, supra note 33, at 9.
377. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 103 (1996).
378. David L. Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 753, 778 (1994).
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and answered the same way under the Due Process Clause in those
cases as under some amalgamation of provisions.
The same critique would apply to all of the other examples.
Rights-based clause aggregation is merely a way to ask whether
the challenged governmental action infringes a liberty that should
be protected under the Constitution. That same question can
always be asked under the Due Process Clause. The Court also has
some room to manipulate what qualifies as a “fundamental right”
or the standard of review to be applied in its due process cases to
allow it usually to reach the result that it desires.379 Thus, in the
end, it is not logical that the answers it will provide should differ
when it employs clause aggregation versus a direct due process
analysis.
2. Countering the Hypothesis
The central difficulty with the hypothesis that rights-based
clause aggregation doesn’t really matter in constitutional
adjudication is that it cannot be proven. Despite reasons for doubt,
rights-based clause combination may well have been (and continue
to be) outcome-determinative in the identification of constitutional
rights. When the Court has turned to the clause aggregation
approach, there was probably a reason.
In the cases involving the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, aggregation enabled the Court to depart from the
Glucksberg strictures that governed the recognition of
“fundamental rights,” and, thus, to find rights that it could not as
easily have recognized under either clause alone.380 In Griffin and
Douglas, the Court apparently did not want to say there was a
“fundamental right” to an appeal. It also did not want to say, given
the implications, that indigence constitutes a “suspect
classification.” Likewise, in Lawrence, the Court did not want to
say there was a “fundamental right” to engage in the sexual acts
379. See supra notes 191, 236–239 and accompanying text (explaining that
the Court’s approach to recognizing a fundamental right is manipulated to
produce desired outcomes).
380. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956) (determining that States
must provide adequate appellate review to all defendants, regardless of their
ability to pay); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1965) (same).
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involved. And, it was not prepared to say that the petitioners, as
gay or lesbian persons, were subject to a “suspect classification.”
Nonetheless, in all three cases the Court was able to consider both
clauses together and find a need for protection. It also applied
these provisions against the states without declaring the existence
of a “fundamental right.” If clause aggregation somehow had been
deemed an unavailable rhetorical approach, perhaps the Court
would have reached the same outcomes anyway, by simply
identifying a “fundamental right” to an appeal or to intimate
sexual activity. However, given the Glucksberg strictures,381 that
conclusion seems far from certain.
The same could be said about Obergefell. If there were no
Equal Protection Clause, we cannot be sure that the Court would
have reached the same result, even if we strongly suspect it. The
complexity of dual violations that the Court introduced into the
case by emphasizing that an unfairly subordinated group was
being unfairly subordinated again—a problem the Court could
express as a violation of equality—provided an especially strong
confining effect on the ruling. The Court could “respond to the
Lochner bugaboo by invoking the theme of antisubordination.”382
The ability to tightly wind “the double helix of Due Process and
Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity”383 allowed Justice
Kennedy to break out of the Glucksberg constraints with less
concern that the rulings would have unduly expansive
implications.384 On this view, clause aggregation might have
mattered.
As for cases in which the Court combined provisions from the
first eight Amendments with the Due Process Clause and others
as well, we also cannot be sure that the aggregation did not
influence outcomes. Consider again Stanley, where the Court cited
multiple clauses to recognize a right to view obscene pornography
privately at home and, ultimately, to declare it a “fundamental”

381. See supra notes 227–233 and accompanying text (discussing that the
Court’s modern approach has limited the recognition of fundamental rights to
those “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”).
382. Tribe, supra note 36, at 19 nn.19–20.
383. Id. at 17 n.11.
384. See Yoshino, supra note 51, at 171 (asserting that the Court provided the
principle for distinguishing Lochner “in its synthesis of liberty and equality”).
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right.385 If clause aggregation was an improper methodology,
would the Court have reached the same outcome directly under the
Due Process Clause? Perhaps, yet viewing obscene pornography
seems rather sybaritic, and we should not forget that obscenity is
generally excluded from First Amendment protection.386 The
reluctance of the Court to endorse obscene pornography more
broadly hints that the majority might only have been able to get to
its conclusion by combining the “right to receive information and
ideas,” which was itself grounded on two clauses in the First
Amendment—the freedom “of speech and press,”387—with “the
right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from
unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy,”388 which
was
grounded
on
Griswold’s
multi-clause
penumbral
389
emanations. Clause aggregation helped limit the precedent so as
not to protect, on the one hand, public displays of obscene
pornography, or, on the other hand, injecting heroin or possessing
a sawed-off shotgun or shoulder-mounted missile launcher in the
privacy of one’s home.390 It also helped avoid claims of
Lochnernerizing, which was harder to do “within the confines of
the due process clauses,” because they “expressly list life, liberty
and property as interests subject to due process protections.”391 In
the end, despite doubt, we cannot be certain that clause
aggregation did not influence the outcome.

385. See supra notes 321–329 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Court relied on the First and Fourteenth Amendments in Stanley.
386. See supra note 321 and accompanying text (citing Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), wherein the court determined that obscenity is not
constitutionally protected speech or press). The Court continued to maintain this
view after Stanley. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“[O]bscene
material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”).
387. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (citing Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).
388. Id.
389. See supra notes 318, 378 and accompanying text (stating that the Court
found that married couples have a right to use contraception by “penumbras,
formed by emanations” from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments (citation omitted)).
390. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11 (“What we have said in no way infringes
upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other
items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime.”).
391. Kanter, supra note 288, at 672.
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Even regarding Griswold, clause aggregation may have moved
forward a ruling that would not otherwise have come until later.
The Court at that time clearly was concerned about not
re-Lochnernizing substantive due process.392 The Griswold Court
never mentioned the words “fundamental right,” even though it
applied the protection against a state. The worry over Lochner was
further evidenced by the majority’s failure even to mention the Due
Process Clause as one of those from which a zone might also
emanate and contribute to the liberty protection that it identified
as surrounding contraception.393 Nonetheless, the Griswold idea
that multiple clauses, through overlapping zones emanating from
their core and penumbral rights, can give rise to a new right not
covered by the core or penumbra of any clause alone is not
insensible.394 The Griswold Court did not explain this idea well,
but it is comprehensible, as Professor Stephen Kanter has
demonstrated.395 It is even plausible to see the core of particular
clauses in the first eight amendments as falling within the core of
the Due Process Clause, and yet see overlapping zones emanating
from one or more of those clauses and from the larger Due Process
Clause that give rise to rights that no single clause, through its
core or penumbra, could support.396 While the Griswold opinion
392. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, at 850 (“In an attempt to avoid
substantive due process, Douglas, who had lived through the Lochner era, found
privacy in the ‘penumbra’ of the Bill of Rights.”).
393. See id. at 849 (“Douglas, however, expressly rejected the argument that
the right was protected under the liberty of the due process clause.”).
394. See Kanter, supra note 288, at 624 (“[T]here is legitimacy and vitality to
this theory, even though it was rather vaguely and poorly explained in
Griswold.”).
395. See id. at 625–40 (discussing the analytical approach to finding
fundamental rights in the majority opinion in Griswold).
396. Professor Michael Coenen insightfully expressed the underlying
problem:
Can we sensibly claim that a law “kind of,” “partially,” or “barely”
complies with the dictates of a particular constitutional clause, or must
we always reach the conclusion that the law either fully does or fully
does not comply? I do not have a definitive answer to this question,
and, in some sense, no such answer may exist. We are all free to adopt
whatever metaphysical picture of the clauses we want to adopt, and it
is hard for me to think of any objective criteria by which one such
picture would qualify as more conceptually valid than any other. Some
of us might prefer to compare the clauses to on/off switches, whereas
others might prefer to compare them to sliding scales. We may have
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was problematic for several reasons,397 the Court majority
apparently was not ready to find a fundamental right to protect
marital contraceptive use directly under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Even if the majority’s thinking was illogical or
ill-formed, the clause aggregation alternative may have helped one
or more of those Justices to get to the Griswold holding.
In the end, if my allegation about the invalidity of rights-based
clause aggregation was true, it would also perhaps prove too much.
The idea that clause aggregation has been irrelevant would mean
that the Court’s modern substantive due process approach, as
represented by Glucksberg, would have blown up long ago if it ever
got off the ground. For, without the route for recognizing and
protecting new rights offered by clause aggregation, the Court
would have to have somehow recognized and protected those same
rights, and in each case from the very start, directly through the
Due Process Clause, which would not have been possible while
maintaining any allegiance to the Glucksberg framework.
This reality points us back to the meaning of Obergefell, which
used clause aggregation but also found a “fundamental right” to
same-sex marriage by circumventing Glucksberg. Professors Kenji
Yoshino and Laurence Tribe have concluded that Obergefell has
now effectively blown up the Glucksberg strictures398 and
good practical arguments for favoring one conception over the other,
but I suspect that any further conceptual debating of the issue would
prove fruitless. There is, I suspect, no “right” or “wrong” view of the
clauses metaphysical structure; there are only different metaphors
that we may or may not choose to employ.
Coenen, supra note 28, at 1095.
397. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 33, at 9
Justice Douglas called the amendments and their penumbras ”zones of
privacy,“ though of course they are not that at all. They protect both
private and public behavior and so would more properly be labelled
‘zones of freedom’ . . . . We are left with no idea of the sweep of the right
of privacy.
See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, at 850 (asserting that the opinion also
does not seem to achieve Douglas’s goal of avoiding substantive due process
because the Bill of Rights is applied to the states as a matter of due process, so
that “the penumbral approach is thus ultimately a due process analysis”).
398. See Yoshino, supra note 51, at 162 (“After Obergefell, it will be much
harder to invoke Glucksberg as binding precedent.”); Tribe, supra note 36, at 16
n.4 (asserting that the Obergefell decision “represents the culmination of a
decades-long project that has revolutionized fundamental rights jurisprudence”
and “has definitely replaced Washington v. Glucksberg’s wooden three-prong
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reconstructed substantive due process analysis based heavily on
Obergefell’s emphasis on “anti-subordination” or “equal dignity.”399
I am not as sure, particularly because the anti-subordination
principle offers little help in explaining some of the fundamental
rights the Court has previously recognized, such as the one
recognized in Stanley. I suggest that an important question to ask
about Obergefell is whether it should be understood primarily to
have constructed a grand new approach to substantive due process
or primarily to have given a new bit of impetus to clause
aggregation. I contend that these two ideas are not the same thing
and that we should consider whether the latter view might be the
more salient one.
C. Is Clause Aggregation Principled Enough To Matter?
Although rights-based clause aggregation may sometimes
affect outcomes in Supreme Court decision-making, one could still
doubt that it has mattered often enough and in a sufficiently
principled way to have any normative force for the future. Indeed,
I hypothesize in this section that rights-based clause aggregation
is too rarely important and too unprincipled in its application for
litigators ever to anticipate that it would succeed. Yet, while this
hypothesis might actually be true, I reject the view that litigators
should not focus more on aggregation arguments, especially after
Obergefell. Most of the contours remain undeveloped in the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on rights-based clause
aggregation. Yet, those who aim to foresee how constitutional
rights will advance must try to find bases to understand how that
approach could contribute to the recognition of new constitutional
rights in the future.

test”).
399. See Yoshino, supra note 51, at 174 (“What emerges from Lawrence and
Obergefell is a vision of liberty that I will call ‘antisubordination liberty.’”); Tribe,
supra note 36, at 20 nn.25–26 (asserting that “the rubric under which
fundamental rights should be evaluated going forward is what I will call the
doctrine of equal dignity”).
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1. The Hypothesis of Unpredictably Rare Application

The principal reasons to doubt that the Court’s rather atypical
use of rights-based clause aggregation has been principled enough
to carry predictive power are of two sorts. First, the Court has
never articulated rules or standards that help resolve when such
aggregation is appropriate, and those measures are not obvious
from the decisions. Second, the Court has failed to use clause
aggregation in plenty of situations in which commentators have
argued that it would have been warranted. Based on these
omissions, a litigator could reasonably conclude that offering an
argument based on rights-based clause aggregation—like a claim
calling for recognition of a new “fundamental right” under the Due
Process Clause alone—will always be akin to a Hail Mary. The best
bet will almost always will be on failure.
In none of the cases in which the Court has employed
rights-based clause aggregation has it provided a decent
explanation for why, when or how the approach should apply. The
Griswold opinion has been ridiculed for its vacuity on this score.400
The Court did make a bit of effort at explanation way back in Boyd,
but the assertions were more confounding than illuminating,401
and, of course, Boyd was overruled both as to its holding and its
rationales after the Fourth Amendment was incorporated and
became important.402 Look for a good explanation of the rules or
standards governing clause aggregation in the opinions in
Barnette, Griffin, Stanley, or any other Supreme Court case, and
you will come up empty-handed. Even in Obergefell, Chief Justice
Roberts’s dissent was charitable in describing Justice Kennedy’s
explanation of a “profound” connection and “synergy”403 between
liberty and equality as “difficult to follow.”404 Justice Kennedy’s
400. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 33, at 84 (“Douglas . . . skipped through the
Bill of Rights like a cheerleader—‘Give me a P . . . give me an R . . . give me an
I . . .,’ and so on, and found P-R-I-V-A-C-Y as a derivative or penumbral right.”).
401. See supra notes 289–296 and accompanying text (arguing the Court’s use
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)
was an early example of clause aggregation).
402. See supra notes 199–203 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Court overruled Boyd in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1976)).
403. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
404. Id. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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explanation never penetrated the superfice. He said, for example:
“The reasons why marriage is a fundamental right became more
clear and compelling from a full awareness and understanding of
the hurt that resulted from laws barring interracial marriage.”405
Here is another example: “Each concept—liberty and equal
protection—leads to a stronger understanding of the other.”406
Those sorts of statements were reiterations of the conclusion, not
explanations, and Justice Scalia’s response was never refuted: “If
the opinion is correct that the two clauses ‘converge in the
identification and definition of [a] right,’ that is only because the
majority’s likes and dislikes are predictably compatible.”407 In the
end, the problem for those trying to understand the “synergy”
asserted in Obergefell is that, if there was one, “the Court did not
define what the intersectional right consists in.”408
There are also plenty of instances in which commentators
have noted that the Court could have but did not use clause
aggregation,409 and I will offer another. In McCleskey v. Kemp,410
the petitioner challenged his death sentence under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause and the Equal Protection Clause,
using rather compelling statistical evidence to claim that the
Georgia death penalty system unconstitutionally discriminated
against him as a black defendant convicted of killing a white

405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
408. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 26.
409. See, e.g., id. at 39–40 (pointing to Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996), where the Court “famously deemed irrelevant to its Fourth Amendment
analysis whether there was also racial targeting”); Porat & Posner, supra note 27,
at 51–53 (pointing to Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007), involving two Fifth
Amendment claims brought by a rancher against the Bureau of Land
Management, alleging a taking and an illegal form of retaliation); David D.
Meyers, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Hazards of Muddled Scrutiny, 17 J.L. &
POL’Y. 57, 84 (2008) (pointing to Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), where
the Court upheld the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003, without taking
account of the equality implications for women); Faigman, supra note 276, at 663
(noting “the Court has never specifically explained its failure to aggregate rights,
even in cases where it would seem necessary to do so,” and pointing to Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1973), involving denial of a claim for appointment of counsel
for state discretionary appeals in criminal cases).
410. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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victim.411 The Court could have chosen to employ a
clause-combination approach that would have helped it rule in
McCleskey’s favor without setting a precedent that extended
beyond the death penalty context. Instead, the Court chose to
uphold his death sentence, addressing separately the Equal
Protection Clause,412 and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.413 Why this seriatim approach? The answer is mysterious.
Cases like McCleskey help confirm that the Court chooses when to
employ clause aggregation from among the cases where it is
plausibly employed, and the factors that influence that choice are
unspoken by the Court and typically non-evident to the observer.
2. Countering the Hypothesis
The very idea of rights-based clause aggregation means that
claims for new, unenumerated rights are judged at times more like
figure skating than pole vaulting. In pole vaulting, one’s score
depends entirely on whether one gets over the still-standing bar,
and there are no partial points for nice tries. Figure skating, by
contrast, is not about such “all or nothing” leaps but about the
overall quality of a presentation, in which a win may come from
partial points for several jumps that were each imperfect but
together were impressive. There is nothing theoretically wrong
with this latter scoring approach. The rules for constitutional
construction are not part of the natural order. And, as Professor
Michael Coenen notes, the accumulation of partial points through
clause aggregation is logical in theory: “Just as my limited desire
to see a movie and my limited desire to buy clothes might together
yield an overwhelming desire to go to the mall, so too might clauses
providing limited individual support for a judicial result operate
together to generate strong collective support for the result.”414

411. For a summary of the study, see DAVID C. BALUDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE
AND THE DEATH PENALTY 40–228, 306–69 (1990).
412. See id. at 291–99 (addressing McCleskey’s claim that the statute violates
the Equal Protection clause).
413. See id. at 299–313 (addressing McCleskey’s claim that the capital
sentencing system violates the Eighth Amendment).
414. Coenen, supra note 28, at 1067.

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE AGGREGATION

857

Admittedly, the Court has not developed a method for deciding
when to award and cumulate partial credit under each of multiple
clauses, nor any method for deciding how many partial points to
award for each of multiple imperfect constitutional contentions.
Yet,
these
problems
may
be
largely
unavoidable.
Clause-aggregation problems represent a series of unusual, if not
one-off, conundrums that are not easily handled by a set of rules,
standards or balancing tests.
Despite the uncertainties, there are some factors that
probably influence the judicial use of rights-based clause
aggregation that no interested litigants or observers should ignore.
Obviously, a court is most likely to use the technique when the
court has difficulty justifying the requested unenumerated
protection as a “fundamental right” based on history and tradition
but still finds the request compelling. “[J]udicial decision precedes
articulate theory.”415 That point is banal, but remembering it leads
to another point that is more important. A court is more likely to
use clause aggregation where the proponent of the right uses the
approach to make the requested right appealing. Clause
aggregation can sometimes assist in such an effort by enabling the
full presentation of the various aspects of the harm involved with
a challenged government action. If the litigant doesn’t use the
strategy in a case where it could help persuade, the court is less
likely to be persuaded. The court will then probably see the harm
as it has been presented—divided into pieces—and think about the
pieces separately.
A few patterns to be gleaned from the Supreme Court’s use of
rights-based clause aggregation may also help predict its future
application. First, as with claims addressed singularly under the
Due Process Clause, the Court has more often recognized negative
fundamental rights (the right to be free from governmental
restraint) than positive fundamental rights (the right to a
government benefit).416 There are exceptions to this pattern, such
as the provision of transcripts and counsel in Griffin and Douglas.
However, in the vast majority of multiple-clause cases, including
Boyd, Barnette, Griswold, Stanley, Roberts, Dale, Yoder, and
Lawrence, the right recognized was one involving freedom from
415.
416.

RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 194 (1995).
Supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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government intrusion. We could also understand Obergefell as
falling in the latter group, but marriage is a mixed bag, because its
provision “creates a zone of privacy into which the state cannot
intrude,” but also “requires the state to grant the parties
recognition and benefits.”417 Still, on the whole, the cases suggest
that a request for recognition of a negative rather than a positive
right is probably more likely to prevail.
The cases on clause aggregation also reveal a particular
concern by the Court with “privacy.” Griswold purported to
vindicate privacy by combining various clauses from the first
eighth amendments to protect marital use of contraception.418
Stanley also demonstrated a special concern with protecting
privacy by relying on Griswold to protect private viewing of
obscene pornography.419 Lawrence, while purporting to protect the
right of gay and lesbian persons to engage in intimate sexual
contact under the Equal Protection Clause, relied heavily on
Griswold and the right to privacy.420 Although the claim to privacy
will not shield all private conduct from government intrusion, it
will favor the proponent of the right, at least where the conduct
involved involves no harm to others.421
Claims involving “somewhat-suspect” discrimination along
with “semi-fundamental” rights also seem to gain traction with the
Court. This is what Justice Kennedy may have been referencing
through the “synergy” idea in Obergefell. There, the synergy notion
seemed like surplusage, because the Court earlier asserted that it
already had identified same-sex marriage as a “fundamental”

417. Yoshino, supra note 51, at 168.
418. See supra notes 314–319 and accompanying text (stating that in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) the Court found married couples
have a right to use contraception by “penumbras, formed by emanations” from the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
419. Supra notes 324–328 and accompanying text.
420. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–65 (2003) (discussing Griswold
as “the beginning point in our decision”); id. at 578 (noting that the case “does not
involve public conduct” and declaring that “[t]he petitioners are entitled to respect
for their private lives” and that “[t]he State cannot demean their existence or
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime”).
421. See id. (emphasizing that “[t]he present case does not involve minors” or
“persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused”).
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right.422 However, where that is not true, the idea has more allure.
To demonstrate, imagine that we are picking coffee for ten millibits
per basket. Most of us would be annoyed, even mad enough to
complain, if the farm manager for the public owner paid eighty
percent of the pickers (not us) two extra millibits per basket
because they were good-looking. Assuming there were no
minimum wage established, a court might conclude that, while
“less-than-good-looking” persons is not a suspect classification, and
while the manager’s discrimination has a rational basis (the
manager prefers being around attractive people and thinks
everyone else is happier and works harder), there ought to be a
prohibition against this. A living wage is semi-fundamental to
one’s existence, and discrimination based on good looks versus bad
looks amounts to a somewhat-suspect classification. So, what
should the court do? On this set of facts, the court might say there
ought to be a right to a living wage of twelve millibits per basket.423
It’s not because twelve millibits per basket is a fundamental right
or because “less-than-good-looking” is a suspect classification. It’s
because of the combination of a semi-fundamental interest and
somewhat-suspect classification. This is the idea represented in
cases like Griffin, Douglas, and Lawrence. The right rests on two
clauses that neither alone would support it. While avoiding the
Glucksberg strictures, the combination also confines the precedent
based on the complexities.
The cases also reveal that the combined clauses should not
double-count injury to create a new right.424 This requirement can
422. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“[T]he reasons
marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to
same-sex couples.”).
423. This outcome is not, however, compelled by the facts or by anything
inherent in notions of liberty, equality or their combination. The court could
decide that everyone should get just ten millibits per basket. The court could
decide that everyone should get eleven and six-tenths millibits per basket. The
Court could decide that good-looking people should get one but not two extra
millibits per basket. Or, the Court could decide that nobody is getting paid enough
and that everyone should receive at least fourteen millibits per basket. That none
of these possibilities is necessarily wrong coincides with the view that the notion
of a “synergy” between liberty and equality doesn’t lead to particular answers
about “fundamental rights.”
424. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), exemplifies this idea in an
immigration case involving two claims of discrimination. One of the petitioners,
a U.S. citizen, challenged the denial of a visa to his biological son born out of
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sometimes present “difficult value judgments”425 that can “mask
what are at their core normative debates about what the substance
of the doctrines should be.”426 Yet, clearly some combination claims
would only seek double credit for harm already fully encompassed
by one of the clauses.427 For example, suppose a federal criminal
defendant claimed a denial of both the right to effective assistance
of counsel and the right to due process from defense counsel’s
failure to object to improper comments by the prosecutor in closing
argument. If the argument is not a winner because of inadequate
prejudice under either clause alone, it does not become a winner
when the claim is brought as a hybrid. Each clause would already
take account of whatever prejudice was involved, and that harm
would either be enough to constitute a violation or it would not.428
Separate clauses should account for separate aspects of an injury

wedlock. Id. at 790. Under then-existing law, the child of a non-married father
was not entitled to a visa based on the father’s status as a citizen. Id. Petitioner
claimed the statute discriminated against him both as a man and as a non-marital
father. Id. Because of the “plenary power” doctrine, only rational-basis review
would normally apply. Id. Petitioner’s counsel argued that the dual nature of the
discrimination justified heightened scrutiny. Id. Yet, this was an effort to have
the Court double count the same injury to create a special right, and the Court
rejected it. See id. at 794 (“[T]his Court has resolved similar challenges to
immigration legislation based on other constitutional rights of citizens, and has
rejected the suggestion that more searching judicial scrutiny is required.”).
425. Coenen, supra note 28, at 1124.
426. Id. at 1125.
427. See id. at 1122–25 (“Just as courts might undervalue the
combination-based elements of a prior decision, so too might they overvalue these
elements, by combining constitutional clauses that have already been
combined.”); Faigman, supra note 276, at 662 (“To be sure, certain specific
constitutional values can be found implicit in both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and so, double counting must be avoided when aggregating
rights.”).
428. Professors Kerry Abrams and Brandon Garrett would make the case, I
believe, that the right to effective assistance of counsel already vindicates both
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the due process right to a fair trial.
See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 31 (“The right to effective assistance of
counsel at trial and during pre-trial representation, itself goes further than the
Sixth Amendment text, which guarantees a right to a lawyer, but not an effective
one.”). This insight would help illuminate why trying to create a hybrid-clause
claim for relief on these facts would amount to double counting and should be
rejected. However, even if the right to effective assistance of counsel is viewed as
grounded solely in the Sixth Amendment, there would still be double-counting
going on.
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the aggregation of which none of the clauses would encompass
alone.429
The cases also reveal that the harms aggregated under
multiple clauses must cohere around a relatively specific right for
it to receive recognition. Otherwise, the grievant could simply
point to various constitutional clauses in combination to support a
“right to be treated fairly” or a “right to a fair trial,” and, to
establish a violation, offer a series of scattered complaints each
with some substance but none amounting to a constitutional
violation. This will not do. The Supreme Court has not clarified
how specific the right must be to receive recognition through clause
aggregation. Nonetheless, one can see from reviewing the Court’s
decisions that the recognized rights are generally quite specific.
Even when the Court has expressed the right in overly-broad
terms, such as the right to “privacy,” the liberty actually protected
could be defined narrowly.
If the past is prologue, clause aggregation will not work very
often to promote the recognition of new constitutional rights. Yet,
it is important to try to envision situations in which the approach
might apply. That brings us back to recreational marijuana
activities. Could clause aggregation at some point help make the
case for a constitutional right to use and possess marijuana in
limited circumstances? We now turn to that question.
V. The Clause Aggregation Case for a Right To Possess and Use
Marijuana for Recreational Purposes
The case for a federal constitutional right to engage in
recreational marijuana activities in states that continue to
criminalize that conduct is for the future. At present, there are
strong arguments favoring a constitutional right to possess and
use marijuana for therapeutic purposes in jurisdictions that do not
yet permit even medical use.430 There are also plausible
arguments, based in part on federalism concerns, to support a
429. See Faigman, supra note 276, at 662 (“[D]ouble counting must be avoided
when aggregating rights.”).
430. See supra notes 247–253 and accompanying text (arguing that
marijuana becomes fundamentally important to one’s well-being when consumed
to relieve “excruciating pain and suffering”).
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constitutional challenge to federal prosecutions of minor
marijuana crimes in states that have stopped criminalizing such
conduct.431 However, for recreational marijuana activities, the
time probably has not arrived for recognition of a federal
constitutional right, regardless of how proponents frame the
argument. There is not a sufficient national consensus to support
the claim, as demonstrated by the still small number of states that
have legalized recreational marijuana and the continuing
criminalization at the federal level.432 While we have seen grounds
to anticipate that a solid majority of states will legalize for
recreational purposes within a decade or two,433 we have also seen
that single-clause arguments for a constitutional right would not
likely succeed even then.434 But, could proponents of a right prevail
at that point using a clause aggregation approach? In this Part, I
explain why that is a better strategy. As to whether it could
succeed, I answer with cautious affirmance, focusing on adults only
and on use only in private settings and on possession in public only
of small amounts. I limit consideration to those scenarios, because
they present the best possibilities for success.
A. The Clause Aggregation Approach Applied
Clause aggregation, as opposed to a single clause approach,
would favor proponents of the right in three ways. First, it would
allow them to present, for balancing against the state’s interests,
a more complete picture of the harms caused by the marijuana
prohibition. Second, it would allow a court to use the greater
complexity of considerations involved to better confine the
431. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (suggesting that marijuana
could be removed from the federal Controlled Substances Act, thus resolving a
federalism concern).
432. See supra notes 125–134 and accompanying text (noting that only eight
states plus D.C. have legalized marijuana and that tension remains between
federal and state law enforcement).
433. See supra notes 135–143 and accompanying text (suggesting that more
states will legalize recreational marijuana use on a limited basis within only a
few years).
434. See supra Part II (examining why alternative arguments under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process
Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause would likely fail).
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precedential effect of a ruling in their favor. Third, the first two
effects could encourage the Court to apply a higher level of scrutiny
to the state’s asserted rationales for prohibition and, ultimately, to
produce a ruling in the proponents’ favor. To understand how these
effects would play out, let’s hypothesize persons similar to those
we imagined in Part II, adult defendants charged in criminal cases
with minor marijuana offenses. We are again assuming that thirty
states have legalized minor marijuana activity. Let’s also imagine
now that the defendants are among a broader group of civil
plaintiffs that includes users or would-be users of marijuana who
are suing for declaratory relief against the enforcement of a state’s
marijuana laws, by claiming a federal constitutional right.435
Exploring the interests of the individual that these plaintiffs could
emphasize by employing a clause aggregation approach can help
us see why they are more likely to prevail than our hypothetical
litigants in Part II, who focused on single clause arguments.
1. Bringing to Light the Individual Interests
As we saw in Part II, a single clause approach to challenging
the cannabis laws based on the existence of a constitutional right
never requires the reviewing court to consider the balance of
interests involved between individuals and the state. A categorical
challenge under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause alone
can be tossed as quickly as the court concludes that there is not
enough evidence of a national consensus against marijuana
prohibitions.436 A categorical challenge under the Fourth
Amendment will be rejected out of hand on the view that such
435. Attacking federal marijuana crimes through a civil action for declaratory
relief was the approach followed by the unsuccessful plaintiffs, medical marijuana
users, and their marijuana providers in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). See
also Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (following, on remand,
the Supreme Court’s decision, affirming the district court’s denial of motion for
preliminary injunction). To meet constitutional standing requirements, “the
plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to
the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (citation omitted). Our hypothetical plaintiffs could
meet this standard. See generally Raich, 500 F.3d. at 857.
436. See supra Part II.A (concluding that the hypothetical defendants should
expect to lose because they engaged in affirmative, voluntary conduct that society
has not yet sufficiently condoned).
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claims are not contemplated by that provision.437 A challenge
under the Due Process Clause, since there is no “fundamental
right” based on history and tradition, will only require the
government to show a rational basis for its marijuana crimes,
something it can accomplish merely by stating a few plausible
concerns associated with marijuana usage.438 The same is true
under the Equal Protection Clause, once the court finds that the
challengers are not subject to a suspect classification.439 The
various interests of the individual with regard to the marijuana
laws do not even make it to the surface to be acknowledged under
this single-clause approach. They are essentially irrelevant.
What about under a clause aggregation approach? First, let’s
consider what interests are at stake in relation to the marijuana
prohibition for our hypothetical litigants. At the highest level of
abstraction, they would allege that it is about their liberty or
autonomy to experience their life as they please as long as they do
no significant harm to others, which also encompasses the idea
that they do no major harm to themselves. In more specific terms,
for those arrested and charged, the interest is in avoiding
punishments, fines, fees, and stigma related to their potential
criminal convictions for what they would say is essentially
non-culpable behavior, as demonstrated by its legalization in a
super-majority of states. For those who want to use marijuana or
want to use it more than they do but have been deterred by the
law, it would be the loss of the benefits of use, a similar loss of
autonomy in their efforts to endure the vicissitudes of life. In
addition to its therapeutic benefits for many users,440 marijuana
brings a feeling of well-being and pleasure to many others,441 which
437. See supra Part II.B (noting that, under modern Fourth Amendment law,
there are no categories of ordinary criminal evidence that are recognized as
immune from police search and seizure).
438. See supra Part II.C (noting that states can easily satisfy the “rational
basis” standard of review).
439. See supra Part II.D (stating that criminalizing marijuana activity
involves no discrimination based on a suspect classification or improper purpose).
440. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (identifying conditions which
cannabis or cannabinoids are effective for treating).
441. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 506 (Alaska 1975) (stating that “[t]he
immediate psychological effects of marijuana are typically a mild euphoria and a
relaxed feeling of well-being,” and many users also experience “a heightened
sensitivity to taste and to visual and aural sensations”).

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE AGGREGATION

865

is why, before 2014, 111 million Americans had tried marijuana,
despite its widespread illegality.442 For many of the plaintiffs,
there would also be the loss of privacy and security in their
persons, homes and effects from the actual or feared intrusion by
the police to discover the marijuana. For many of the plaintiffs,
there would also be the added injury of realizing that they are
being treated differently in their own state than similarly situated
persons who possess or use alcohol or tobacco, substances that are
more dangerous to the user or others than cannabis, but not
prohibited.443
The Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment encompass
these concerns sufficiently to conclude that considering and
weighing them seems relevant in asking whether a marijuana
prohibition is constitutionally sensible. The Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause is concerned with over-punishing conduct or,
according to Robinson v. California, making something criminal
that is not sufficiently culpable to merit criminalization.444 The
Fourth Amendment is concerned with protecting the privacy of
one’s home and the security of one’s person and effects against
governmental invasion. According to Griswold v. Connecticut and
Stanley v. Georgia, the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments
also come together with the Fourth Amendment to provide an
especially strong “privacy” protection for the home.445 Further, the
liberties protected in a substantive sense by the Due Process
Clause extend to “certain personal choices central to individual
dignity and autonomy,”446 and decisions regarding what to
consume or ingest into one’s body come near the core of those
libertarian concerns. Finally, the Equal Protection Clause focuses
on troubling disparities in the treatment of persons,447 which our
442. See Boffey, supra note 22, at A22 (reporting that, despite its illegality,
marijuana is less dangerous than alcohol and tobacco).
443. See id. (positing that marijuana’s “downsides are not reasons to impose
criminal penalties on its possession, particularly not in a society that permits
nicotine use and celebrates drinking”).
444. See supra notes 162–169 and accompanying text (deciding that a
California law could not criminalize a mere status in lieu of actual culpable
conduct).
445. See supra notes 257–259 and accompanying text (finding privacy
protection in the “penumbras” of these amendments).
446. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).
447. See supra notes 257–258 and accompanying text (directing that persons
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plaintiffs allege occurs between marijuana users and users of
alcohol and tobacco. While none of these clauses alone would give
rise to a right to possess and use marijuana, they can be
understood to come together to make relevant the individual
interests at stake in determining whether the Constitution,
through its “broader postulates,”448 creates such a right.
To focus on this broader set of individual interests in assessing
the constitutional question is not to engage in judicial legislating.
The constitutional propriety of such an inquiry is highlighted by
recognizing that clause aggregation would not make relevant all of
the evidence and arguments that proponents of the right might
want to offer against the marijuana laws in a legislative context.
For example, proponents of the right might wish to present
evidence and argument that our marijuana prohibitions have
negatively affected Mexico, by fomenting a black market that has
helped sustain illegal Mexican drug cartels that, in turn, have
spurred violence and corruption in that country.449 Indeed, prior to
the beginning of legalization in the United States, marijuana
accounted for about one and one-half billion dollars per year for
those cartels, approximately twenty percent of their annual

in an equal position should be treated equally).
448. Tribe, supra note 36, at 18 n.16. Although I do not aim to resolve the
precise contours of the right, a clause-aggregation approach could readily confer
more than mere freedom from criminal sanctions. Consider that a state might
impose civil bans and sanctions, including property forfeitures, on minor
marijuana activity. For a discussion of civil sanctions on marijuana activity, see
MIKOS, supra note 1, at 92. Civil bans and sanctions would not implicate the same
injury to one’s liberty that arises with a criminal conviction and sentence, but
could still raise similar concerns to criminal bans, including widespread invasions
of privacy. Some states empower law enforcement to conduct searches for civil as
well as criminal contraband. See id. at 166–70 (presenting contrasting state-court
cases that allow and disallow searches for marijuana as civil contraband). Thus,
a clause-aggregation approach seemingly could justify striking down civil bans
and sanctions if it justified striking down criminal bans and sanctions. At the
same time, I propose a right to use and possess marijuana only as a negative right
against state interference. Moreover, I do not propose that it would necessarily
entail freedom from all state-imposed burdens on use and possession, such as
taxes or even criminal prohibitions on marijuana transactions.
449. See Elisabeth Malkin & Azam Ahmed, Ruling in Mexico Sets Into Motion
Legal Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2015, at A1 (noting the political corruption
and violence fomented in Mexico by the drug cartels, explaining the importance
of marijuana to their revenues, and asserting that legalization of U.S. marijuana
production could dry up demand for Mexican marijuana in the U.S.).
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revenues.450 While the consequences for our neighboring country
might be another policy reason to favor legalization, it is an
argument for legislative reform and not properly part of the
constitutional calculus.451
Considering the various interests of the right proponents also
arguably makes sense here. As we have seen, there are no
established criteria that define when a court is to view as a unified
whole some set of individually imperfect claims that each tie to
different clauses.452 However, we have also seen patterns that
appear in the Supreme Court cases involving multi-clause
rights,453 and the claims of our defendant fit the patterns. Although
not an absolute requirement, the defendants seek a negative
liberty rather than a positive one, meaning they seek only to be left
alone by government rather to gain an entitlement. The rights for
which they seek recognition also can be understood as fairly
specific—the right to possess and use marijuana—rather than as
only a highly abstract one, such as a right to be treated fairly.
Likewise, the harms they seek to aggregate are separate in the
sense that combining them would not involve merely a ruse of
double-counting. At the same time, the harms they allege logically
tie together as the individual interests at stake when a government
criminalizes even minor marijuana activity.

450. See BEAU KILMER, JONATHAN P. CAULKINS, BRITTANY M. BOND & PETER H
REUTER, REDUCING DRUG TRAFFICKING REVENUES AND VIOLENCE IN MEXICO:
WOULD LEGALIZING MARIJUANA IN CALIFORNIA HELP?
3
(2010),
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pd
f (estimating gross revenues from moving marijuana across the border into the
United States and selling it to wholesalers).
451. A variety of other concerns might also affect the legislative question but
not the constitutional question. For example, states could allocate law
enforcement and correctional resources that are dedicated to marijuana to other
problems, and could also tax marijuana sales, producing resources for supporting
the enforcement of laws against more dangerous drugs. See KAPLAN, supra note
18, at 349 (“Licensing the sale of marijuana . . . might also have the desired effect
of restricting the underground drug market that today makes available, and even
encourages, the use of drugs far more harmful than marijuana.”).
452. See supra notes 400–410 and accompanying text (noting that the Court
has not provided a decent explanation for why, when, or how the approach should
apply).
453. See supra notes 414–432 and accompanying text (arguing that a court is
more likely to use clause aggregation where the proponent of the right uses the
approach to make the requested right appealing).
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For a court to aggregate, some claims may need to be
“colorable” on an individual basis, and our litigants also arguably
meet that standard. Their claim would not likely prevail under the
Due Process Clause alone, but their due process contention is also
one that a court would likely have trouble rationalizing away as
clearly without merit. After all, given that viewing obscene
pornography at home was declared a “fundamental right” in
Stanley,454 why is it so obvious that using marijuana at home (or
even having a small amount in one’s pocket in public) should not
qualify? Perhaps there is more harm from marijuana use than
from viewing obscene pornography, but a court would probably
struggle some to justify the differing treatment. Likewise, the
claim of our hypothetical litigants under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause is inadequate by itself to justify their proposed
right, but arguably still a colorable contention. That is so because
we are assuming that a super-majority of states have legalized
recreational marijuana under their own laws, which implies that
a societal consensus has nearly developed that the conduct is
non-culpable.455 The litigants’ aggregation strategy may depend on
whether this claim is colorable. We can see its importance by
imagining how a court would view their clause-aggregation claim
if they presented it today, when only a small number of states have
legalized. A court might well reject the approach and analyze the
case under single clauses, separately.
2. Limiting the Precedent
A second important consequence of employing a
clause-aggregation approach is to increase the complexity of the
rationale for a ruling favoring the existence of the right. The added
454. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (finding that the “right
to read or observe what he pleases” is fundamental to our scheme of individual
liberty).
455. If almost all states plus the federal government had legalized
recreational marijuana, the litigants would have a colorable claim under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause alone—maybe a “near-miss.” See supra
notes 158–175 and accompanying text (suggesting that if society had sufficiently
condoned the use of marijuana, the litigants would have a better Cruel and
Unusual Punishments argument). With only a super-majority of states having
legalized, their claim would be less strong but arguably still colorable.
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complication would actually favor the right proponents. The
multi-sourced basis for a ruling in their favor would help confine
the scope of the holding. A court could try to introduce the same
sort of complexity under a single clause by merely stating that the
holding was limited by various factors. However, that approach
would either alter existing doctrine under those clauses or, if the
court stated that the marijuana case was sui generis, appear as an
unjustified departure from the doctrine. Clause aggregation would
allow the court to justifiably confine the holding, without changing
existing, single-clause jurisprudence.
We have already seen the consequences of an effort by a court
to rule for our right proponents under any single clause. A ruling
for them under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause alone
would imply that the death penalty could also soon become
categorically unconstitutional.456 A ruling for them under the
Fourth Amendment or under the Due Process Clause would imply
that using or possessing dangerous drugs, like heroin, cocaine, and
methamphetamines, should also receive protection.457 A ruling for
them under the Equal Protection Clause would imply that crimes
like polygamy, prostitution, and bestiality are all vulnerable,
because they also involve matters of personal autonomy that
arguably cause only minor social harm and minimal harm to the
defendant.458 Were a court tempted to find a right to pursue minor
marijuana activities under any of the single clauses, the prospect
of those kinds of collateral consequences would provide cause for
second thoughts.
Through clause aggregation, a court could rule for our right
proponents without such concerns. For example, because a ruling
in their favor would rest in part on the liberty under due process
to make “certain personal choices central to individual dignity and

456. See supra notes 176–178 and accompanying text (arguing that if the
Eighth Amendment supported a right to possess or use marijuana, the death
penalty would seem in danger of constitutional invalidation).
457. See supra notes 212–215, 254–256 and accompanying text (arguing that
if the Fourth Amendment supported a right to possess or use marijuana, other
drug crimes might also seem invalid).
458. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (arguing that if marijuana
laws were held to violate equal protection, crimes involving little risk of serious
harm to the participants or others might become vulnerable).
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autonomy,”459 the validity of the death penalty would not be put in
question by also basing the ruling on the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. Few persons would conclude that “individual
dignity and autonomy” encompass the right to commit a capital
crime. Likewise, because a ruling in their favor would rest in part
on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the validity of
dangerous drug-possession crimes would not be put in doubt by
also basing the ruling on the Due Process Clause or the Fourth
Amendment. Doubt over the societal consensus as to the
permissibility of minor marijuana activity would not extend to
injecting heroin or ingesting crack cocaine, even if conducted
privately in one’s home.
Clause aggregation would also allow a court to justifiably
rebuff claims that it was re-Lochnerizing substantive due process.
This was the concern of the Supreme Court in Griswold,460 that
helps explain why the Court used clause aggregation there.461 The
same benefit would accrue in using clause aggregation to recognize
a right to engage in minor marijuana activities. By relying on
multiple clauses rather than due process alone, the Court would
not have to declare the existence of a “fundamental” right to use
and ingest marijuana. It could simply find the right to exist under
multiple clauses, and the protection would apply automatically to
the states because several of those clauses have already been
incorporated. This was the Court’s approach not only in Griswold
but in several other clause aggregation decisions declaring new
rights and applying them against the states, such as Lawrence v.
Texas and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.
3. Scrutinizing and Balancing Government Rationales
Clause aggregation potentially produces a third effect that is
a consequence of the first two. Acknowledging the individual
459. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).
460. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, at 850 (“In an attempt to avoid
substantive due process, Douglas, who had lived through the Lochner era, found
privacy in the ‘penumbra’ of the Bill of Rights.”).
461. See supra notes 392–395 and accompanying text (noting how the
majority’s worry over Lochner emanated from its failure to mention the Due
Process Clause as contributing to the liberty protection surrounding
contraception).
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interests at stake and seeing the limiting effect of a multi-sourced
ruling favoring a right can encourage the court to apply a higher
level of scrutiny to the state’s asserted rationales for prohibition.
The very act of taking into account the individual’s interests at
stake contemplates that they also should weigh against the state’s
competing rationales in the calculus over if and when the
marijuana prohibitions are constitutional. Yet, the rational basis
test, which would apply if our proponents made their claim under
the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses alone, would not
allow this.462 That test would focus only on whether the state could
offer some plausible reason for criminalizing minor marijuana
activity, without regard to the competing interests of the rights
proponents.463 To allow scrutiny of those interests, a more
demanding test would have to apply. It need not be “strict
scrutiny,” which would demand the showing by the state of a
“compelling” purpose.464 A form of “intermediate scrutiny” that
asked about whether the state’s marijuana prohibition is
substantially related to an important government purpose would
suffice.465 Application of such an approach could lead a court to rule
in favor of our right proponents regarding private use of marijuana
in one’s home and even public possession of small amounts of
marijuana in public.
To see how the analysis would proceed, let’s assume that the
government would assert four kinds of interests in justifying laws
criminalizing minor marijuana activity. Those interests include
preventing immoral conduct, promoting productive behavior by the
populace, preventing harm to the user and, finally, avoiding social
harm to non-users. While these asserted interests, singularly or
together, would easily satisfy the rational basis test, they would
462. See supra notes 217–219 and accompanying text (explaining that the
rational basis test does not include a balancing of individual versus state
interests).
463. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting that, because
marijuana-related activities arguably will cause at least some risk of minor harm
to the actor, the state can easily meet the rational basis test).
464. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (explaining that
racial classifications are subject to the most exacting scrutiny).
465. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to discrimination based on non-marital, parent-child
relationships); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to gender discrimination).
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not so obviously overcome heightened scrutiny, particularly when
applied to private use of marijuana at home and probably not when
applied to possession of small amounts in most public settings.
Consider first the interest in preventing immoral conduct.
This is not an insubstantial concern of government, and some
crimes find justification largely on this basis. Bestiality and
prostitution are examples. A significant portion of the population
becomes upset knowing that others are engaged in activities that
they deem immoral and particularly upset if the government gives
license to the immorality.466 Government must choose whether to
inflict unhappiness on those persons with high moral standards or,
instead, on those who want to pursue the arguably unethical
behavior,467 and often governments have chosen to disfavor the
latter group. For much of the twentieth century, using marijuana
was widely viewed as depraved,468 and it will still be so viewed by
many persons in the future.469 Yet, while this concern is a good
enough reason to justify criminalizing the behavior under a
rational-basis test, it would almost surely not work under
heightened scrutiny. Viewing obscene pornography is immoral to
many persons, but the Court rejected Georgia’s effort to
criminalize it in Stanley.470 Same-sex sodomy is immoral to many
persons, but the Court rejected Texas’ effort to criminalize it in
Lawrence.471 Under heightened scrutiny, the effort to promote

466. See Bork, supra note 33, at 9–10 (“Where the Constitution does not
embody the moral or ethical choice, the judge has no basis other than his own
values upon which to set aside the community judgment embodied in the
statute.”).
467. See id. (“Every clash between a minority claiming freedom and a majority
claiming power to regulate involves a choice between the gratifications of the two
groups.”).
468. See supra Part I.A (providing the example that by the mid-1930s,
twenty-two states had criminalized the sale or possession or marijuana).
469. See supra notes 145–149 and accompanying text (discussing how many
persons continue to believe that even moderate cannabis use is risky and
immoral).
470. See supra notes 320–329 and accompanying text (averring explicitly to
clause aggregation in justifying a right to view obscene pornography privately at
home).
471. See supra notes 347–356 and accompanying text (protecting the right of
persons to engage in intimate sexual conduct, including with a person of the same
sex).
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morality could not sustain the criminalization of minor marijuana
activity.
The effort to promote productivity among the populace also
probably would not survive heightened scrutiny. Many would
agree that the government has an interest in “form[ing] and
sustain[ing] the character of its citizenry.”472 However, studies
have not found that marijuana, except in a tiny percentage of
heavy users, produces chronic or long-term demotivation. More
than forty years ago, in Ravin v. State,473 the Alaska Supreme
Court relied on a privacy protection grounded in the state
constitution to find a right to use marijuana in one’s home.474 The
Alaska court subsequently applied an intermediate scrutiny test
to the state’s rationales for criminalizing marijuana possession
and rejected the “amotivational syndrome” argument.475 Indeed,
the court found “no adequate justification for the state’s intrusion
into the citizen’s right to privacy by its prohibition of possession of
marijuana by an adult for personal consumption in the home.”476
The right has existed there as a matter of state constitutional law
for more than four decades, and there is no study that indicates
that a significant portion of the Alaska citizenry has become more
apathetic or indolent due to marijuana use.477 Arguably
undermining any such hypothesis, Alaska is one of the states that
legalized minor marijuana activities in 2014.478
Arguments about harm to the marijuana user are also of
questionable force in the face of heightened scrutiny, although they

472. James Q. Wilson, Drugs and Crime, in DRUGS AND CRIME 521, 524
(Michael Tonry & James Q. Wilson eds., 1990).
473. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
474. See id. at 500–01, 511 (noting the effect of an Alaska amendment was to
place privacy among the specifically enumerated rights in Alaska’s constitution).
475. See id. at 507 (relying on the National Commission’s conclusion that
“long-time heavy users do not deviate significantly from their social peers in
terms of mental functioning”).
476. Id. at 511.
477. See Jason Brandeis, Ravin Revisited: Alaska’s Historic Common Law
Marijuana Rule at the Dawn of Legalization, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 309, 309 (2015)
(discussing the Ravin opinion and the subsequent survival of the state
constitutional right to use marijuana in one’s home in more depth).
478. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (noting the states which have
legalized marijuana use).
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would easily satisfy rational-basis review.479 Our right proponents
could not credibly contend that marijuana poses no risks for the
user, as there is plenty of evidence that it can have some ill-effects
on long-term health and mental functioning when consumed
heavily for long periods.480 Young persons are the most vulnerable
to long-term, adverse effects on brain functioning,481 as “the brain
undergoes active development until about age 21.”482 This concern
would justify prohibiting marijuana use by young persons, but not
by adults. The problems with marijuana pale when compared to
the health consequences associated with alcohol and tobacco,
which are legal for adults to consume.483 Marijuana produces
dependence only among a small portion of heavy users, and, even
then, the physical dependence is much lower than that associated
with alcohol or tobacco.484 The risks of fatal overdose of marijuana
are also minimal.485 “[T]he myth that it leads users to more
479. Under a rational-basis review, courts in the past consistently rejected
claims to a right to possess and use marijuana by finding, in part, that states had
a legitimate goal of avoiding harm to the user and to others. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898, 902–03 (Mass. 1969) (finding that the
legislature acted “rationally and reasonably”); Raines v. State, 225 So. 2d. 330,
330 (Fla. 1969) (“This drug is within the category of injurious substances which
the Legislature may regulate and prohibit in the exercise of its police power.”); cf.
People v. McKenzie, 458 P.2d 232, 234 (Colo. 1969) (upholding a state law that
classified marijuana as a narcotic drug against due process and equal protection
challenges).
480. See, e.g., Nora D. Volkow, Ruben D. Baler, Wilson M. Compton & Susan
R.B. Weiss, Adverse Health Effects of Marijuana Use, NEW ENG. J. MED. (June 5,
2014), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMra1402309 (last visited Apr.
14, 2018) (noting various risks, including some disease risks but conceding
substantial uncertainties, such as the lack of a clear connection to lung cancer,
unlike for smoking tobacco) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
481. See AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., WHITE PAPER ON STATE-LEVEL
PROPOSALS TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA 6 (2012) (“Of greatest concern regarding the
brain is use of marijuana during adolescence—a time of ongoing brain
development.”).
482. Boffey, supra note 22, at A22.
483. See id. (“Marijuana cannot lead to a fatal overdose. There is little
evidence that it causes cancer. Its addictive properties, while present, are low,
and the myth that it leads users to more powerful drugs has long since been
disproved.”).
484. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 15, at 25
(“Regular marijuana use does not necessarily indicate dependence.”).
485. See Lachenmeier & Rehm, supra note 22, at 4–6 (concluding that
cannabis is “low risk”).
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powerful drugs has long since been disproved.”486 Admittedly,
uncertainty exists about some of its short-term and long-term
effects, because the consequences of its use have not been studied
to the same degree as with alcohol and tobacco. For example,
concerns exist that marijuana use may tend to promote greater use
of tobacco.487 There are also concerns that marijuana has been bred
in recent decades to be more potent in its primary psychoactive
ingredient, Delta9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC),488 and that it
could be bred to be even more potent in future years, with unknown
consequences for the user.489 However, despite those uncertainties,
a court could easily conclude, as did the Alaska Supreme Court, in
Ravin, that “mere scientific doubts will not suffice” for the state to
“demonstrate a need based on proof that the public health or
welfare will in fact suffer if the controls are not applied.”490 For the
vast majority of users what appears certain is that the greatest
danger from marijuana use where it is a crime is the prospect of
being arrested, jailed, punished and stigmatized as a law-breaker,
injuries that disappear when cannabis is legalized.491
Concern about injury to others from driving under the
influence of marijuana is probably the most powerful reason for a
state to limit even minor marijuana activity by adults.492
Marijuana use does not lead to violent or aggressive behavior.493
486. Boffey, supra note 22, at A22.
487. See CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note
113, at 128 (noting that “interactions with tobacco” could matter greatly).
488. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 505 (Alaska 1975) (“Other cannabis
derivatives with a higher THC content, such as hashish, are available in the
United States . . . .”).
489. See, e.g., CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra
note 113, at 13 (“While there’s not much dispute that potency has increased, there
is dispute over how much it matters.”).
490. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511.
491. On this score, see supra note 23 and accompanying text (exploring the
societal costs of incarceration and enforcement related to marijuana crimes).
492. See INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE
BASE 4 (Janet E. Joy, Stanley J. Watson, Jr., & John A. Benson, Jr. eds., 1999)
(noting that “for most people the primary adverse effect of acute marijuana use is
diminished psychomotor performance” and that, therefore, it is “inadvisable to
operate any vehicle or potentially dangerous equipment while under the influence
of marijuana”).
493. See Boffey, supra note 22, at A22 (“Its effects are mostly euphoric and
mild, whereas alcohol turns some drinkers into barroom brawlers, domestic
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However, marijuana does “reduce[] psychomotor performance in
ways that increase overall risk of accidents and, in particular,
impairs driving.”494 The effect of alcohol on driving appears to be
much worse. Studies have shown that “the overall risk of
involvement in an accident increases by a factor of about 2 when a
person drives soon after using marijuana” while “the overall risk
of a vehicular accident increases by a factor of almost 5 for drivers
with a blood alcohol level above 0.08%, the legal limit in most
countries.”495 Despite the lesser danger of marijuana compared to
alcohol from driving impairment, the problem with marijuana,
unlike alcohol, is the absence of reliable, well-accepted
breathalyzer tests for determining promptly and accurately
whether one is under the influence according to a legally specified
threshold.496 New devices are being developed and used to measure
recent marijuana use, but they remain controversial in part
because it is not clear how to determine the point at which
impairment occurs.497 Whether states can solve this problem in the
next decade remains uncertain. In the meantime, however, we
should not exaggerate the problem. Police officers currently can
still offer substantial evidence of driving under the influence of
marijuana, based on their observations and field tests, plus the
strong odor associated with burned marijuana.498 Likewise, in
abusers or maniacs behind the wheel.”).
494. CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 113,
at 33 (citing J.G. Ramackers, G. Berghause, M. van Laar & O.H. Drummer, Dose
Related Risk of Motor Vehicle Crashes after Cannabis Use, 73 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 109 (2004); J.G. Ramaekers, M.R. Moeller, P. van Ruitenbeck, E.L.
Theunissen, E. Schneider & G. Kauert, Cognition and Motor Control as a
Function of Delta9-THC Concentration in Serum and Oral Fluid: Limits of
Impairment, 85 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 114 (2006)).
495. Volkow et al., supra note 480, at 2223 nn.37, 39.
496. See David Downs, Don’t Hold Your Breath for a Marijuana
“Breathalyzer”
Test,
SCI.
AM.
(Nov.
7,
2016),
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:25uwfSDD7CcJ:https://
www.scientscientificam.com/article/don-t-hold-your-breath-for-a-marijuana-brea
thalyzer-test/+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (last visited Mar. 9, 2018) (noting
that obtaining data “could cost millions of dollars in human trials, and the effects
of the drug vary tremendously between users”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
497. See id. (“[S]cience still lacks data correlating the presence of THC and
actual impairment.”).
498. See, e.g., Mandiberg, supra note 14, at 40–42 (discussing the importance
of the distinctive odor of burned or burning marijuana and the odor of marijuana
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cases involving accidents, “a combination of sobriety checks and
tests of blood, urine or hair for marijuana metabolites . . . can be
enough to convict impaired drivers.”499
While a state purpose to deter drivers from operating under
the influence could justify limits on possession and use of
marijuana, a total prohibition would not substantially relate to
that purpose. The Alaska Supreme Court reached that conclusion
in the Ravin case.500 The court upheld the criminalization of
possession of marijuana in public based on “the need for control of
drivers under the influence” and “the potential for serious harm to
the health and safety of the general public” from such drivers.501
However, relying on the right to “privacy,” the court found that
there was no “close and substantial relationship between public
welfare and control of ingestion of marijuana or possession of it in
the home for personal use.”502 A similar conclusion would seem to
follow under a clause aggregation approach. However, because
clause aggregation would not focus so heavily on the privacy right,
even some public possession of cannabis would seem to warrant
protection. Being in public places outside of an automobile with
marijuana would not present a serious problem. Indeed, even
possession of a small amount of cannabis in the trunk of one’s car
arguably would not be sufficiently problematic. Under heightened
scrutiny, even concern over impaired driving should only justify
prohibitions on public possession that are substantially related to
that concern, such as possession in the passenger area of a vehicle.
B. Objections
Opponents of the right would surely object to the application
of heightened scrutiny here, and I review some of the probable
criticisms that I have not already addressed. First, some opponents
lingering on a subject’s clothing as evidence that a driver has recently smoked the
substance).
499. Downs, supra note 496.
500. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975) (concluding that “no
adequate justification for the state’s intrusion into the citizen’s right to privacy
by its prohibition of possession of marijuana by an adult for personal consumption
in the home has been shown”).
501. Id.
502. Id.
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would likely offer a general broadside against the further use of
rights-based clause aggregation to recognize any non-textual,
constitutional right, on grounds that the approach arrogates too
much power to the courts. Also, opponents would likely offer a
series of more specific objections to the recognition of even a limited
marijuana right, focusing on symbolic messages, drug treaties,
international cooperation against serious drugs, and mission creep
on marijuana. As we have seen, the Supreme Court has exercised
substantial discretion over when to employ rights-based clause
aggregation, and it has not used it on numerous occasions when
commentators contend the approach would appropriately have
applied.503 I do not contend that there is a special reason to think
that the Court would use it to uphold a marijuana right in the
future. At the same time, I contend that neither a general
broadside against rights-based clause aggregation nor the more
specific objections that I will review are good reasons to avoid using
the approach to protect minor marijuana activity.
The general broadside against rights-based clause
aggregation that some opponents might lodge would likely rest on
an originalist view of how courts should interpret the Constitution.
Originalists typically oppose the idea that courts can recognize
non-textual rights as a matter of substantive due process, if only
because it gives too much power to judges to constitutionalize
protections according to their own values.504 Some opponents
might lodge the same kind of objection against rights-based clause
aggregation as a way to recognize new rights. Yet, such an
objection would lack merit. Clause aggregation at least builds on
the text of clauses (something arguably not true of “substantive”
due process)505 and puts the concerns they embody together. As
Professor Michael Coenen has contended, this approach parallels
other interpretative techniques that are standard in constitutional
construction, such as interpretations based on structure or on the

503. See supra notes 409–414 and accompanying text (exploring cases in
which the Court could have applied clause aggregation).
504. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632–37 (2015) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (opposing on originalist grounds the recognition of a right to
same-sex marriage as a matter of substantive due process).
505. See id. at 2631 (arguing against substantive due process doctrine as
“straying from the text of the Constitution”).
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limiting effect of one clause on another.506 Moreover, even ardent
originalists have not objected to rights-based clause aggregation
when they think the outcome appropriate. A good example is the
Dale case,507 in which a five Justice majority used clause
aggregation to recognize a right to expressive association that
enabled the Boy Scouts to exclude gay persons from membership,
despite a state prohibition.508 The most originalist-oriented
Justices, Thomas and Scalia, joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion for the Court without expressed concern that it was
anti-originalist.509
As for specific objections to a judicial opinion declaring a
marijuana right, opponents would likely contend that it would
send the wrong message about marijuana. Particularly if it were
the Supreme Court that were to uphold the right, they might
contend that the public would infer that there is nothing risky
about consuming the drug. This is a legitimate concern, although
I contend that it is not sufficiently weighty that it should influence
the judicial outcome. A court upholding the right could take pains
to clarify that the use of marijuana carries risks and is not
recommended. The Alaska Supreme Court in the Ravin case
demonstrated how to do this. That court emphasized at length that
it opposed the use of marijuana or any “psychoactive” drug and
that every person should “consider carefully the ramifications for
himself and for those around him of using such substances.”510 At
the same time, we should remember that recognition of the right
by the federal Supreme Court would not likely happen before a
super-majority of states had already legalized recreational
marijuana and that the level of illicit use in states in which

506. See Coenen, supra note 28, at 1095–1101 (arguing that “combination
analysis shares significant functional features with two widely utilized tools of
constitutional decision-making: namely, the constitutional avoidance canon and
arguments based on constitutional structure”).
507. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000) (pointing out the
freedom of association in precedent).
508. See supra notes 334–341 and accompanying text (reciting that one of the
group’s desires was not to condone homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior).
509. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 642 (recording that Justices Thomas and Scalia
joined the majority opinion).
510. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975).
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marijuana is prohibited has for decades been quite high.511 These
points suggest that use would likely only increase modestly after a
Supreme Court recognition of the right. Moreover, states opposing
marijuana use could commence an education campaign with
resources saved from the elimination of marijuana enforcement
and resources gained from taxes on marijuana sales to launch an
educational campaign against marijuana consumption.512 In these
circumstances, there is not a compelling reason to believe that a
judicial declaration of the right would contribute much to
undermining public health.
Opponents might also assert that a judicial declaration of the
right to use and possess marijuana would violate our international
obligations. The United States is committed under the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs as Amended by the 1972 Protocol to
restrict the use of marijuana “exclusively to medical and scientific
purposes.”513 Further, the United States is committed under the
1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances to criminalize even minor forms of
marijuana activity other than for medical or scientific purposes.514
These are not self-executing treaties but they have been
implemented by the federal Controlled Substances Act,515 and by
the expectation that states would continue to criminalize minor
511. See supra notes 239, 442 and accompanying text (reporting the number
of Americans who have partaken in marijuana); KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 23–29
(summarizing the extent of marijuana use).
512. See KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 349 (“Such taxation could serve
the . . . purpose of providing revenue for use in combating the drug problem
generally.”).
513. 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as Amended by the 1972
Protocol art. 4., Aug. 8, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 1439; see also Bennett & Walsh, supra
note 86, at 15 (delving into how the United States is obligated to criminalize minor
marijuana activity under this treaty).
514. See 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances art. 3, Dec. 20, 1988, 1988 U.S.T. LEXIS 194
(representing a significant development in the effort to combat illicit trafficking
in drugs at the international level). For discussion of how the language of this
treaty obligates the U.S. to criminalize marijuana activity, see Bennett & Walsh,
supra note 86, at 15–16 (explaining how the drug treaties “plainly obligate
signatories to enact laws punishing participants in recreational marijuana
markets”).
515. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text (discussing how the
Controlled Substances Act is important in fulfilling the United States’ obligations
regarding marijuana under several treaties).
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marijuana activities.516 Yet, there are two answers to an argument
that the Supreme Court should weigh these treaty obligations in
deciding whether there is a constitutional right to possess and use
marijuana. First, the United States has arguably already violated
those treaties517 now that eight states plus the District of Columbia
have legalized minor recreational marijuana activities under their
state laws and the federal government has essentially deferred.518
We would even more clearly violate them when a super-majority of
states legalize. Second, international treaties cannot obligate the
United States Supreme Court to uphold legislation that violates
the United States Constitution.519 Therefore, as difficult as it will
be, the federal executive branch, with the required super-majority
approval by the Senate, must work with other countries to amend
the treaties (which the United States originally championed)520 to
allow for recreational use of marijuana.521
Critics of the right might lodge the closely related charge that
a Supreme Court declaration of a right to use marijuana will
eliminate any pretense that we are in compliance with our
international treaty obligations (assuming they are not amended)
and thereby spur a reduction in international cooperation against
more dangerous drugs, such as heroin and cocaine. As part of this
argument, they might contend that we can at least maintain the
516. See Bennett & Walsh, supra note 86, at 2 (noting the “predicament”
created for the federal government under the treaties when Colorado and
Washington legalized recreational marijuana in 2012).
517. See id. at 17 (asserting in 2014, after only two states had legalized
recreational marijuana, that “if more states take a legalize-and-regulate
approach, a federal-level decision not to prosecute . . . could start to look like a
blanket non-enforcement of implementing legislation—something that, in our
view, the drug treaties do not contemplate”).
518. For more on the deference by the federal government, see supra notes
129–134 and accompanying text (explaining how some accommodations have
been made by federal authorities on a temporary basis).
519. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (asserting that “there is nothing”
in the language of the Constitution “which intimates that treaties and laws
enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the provisions of the
Constitution.”).
520. See Bennett & Walsh, supra note 86, at 18 (“[T]he United States has for
decades been widely and correctly viewed as the treaties’ chief champion and
defender.”).
521. See id. at 21–24 (arguing for the United States to take a leading role in
amending the treaties regarding marijuana).
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appearance of compliance if the marijuana prohibitions in the
federal Controlled Substances Act remain technically in force
along with criminalization in a strong minority of states. However,
by the time a super-majority of states have legalized, the
International Narcotics Control Board, which is the international
body that determines whether member states comply, will have
publicly declared our non-compliance.522 Such a ruling by the
Board already will have dealt a serious blow to the credibility of
the United States on international drug treaty matters. A ruling
of our Supreme Court protecting a limited right to use and possess
marijuana will not do much further damage on the international
front.
A final objection might well focus on the purported illogic of
declaring a right to use and possess marijuana but no right to
produce it for sale or to sell it. More specifically, the objection might
be that, inevitably, the right will extend to commercial marijuana
activity for recreational purposes. The answer is that the same
kind of argument was made but did not turn out true regarding
Stanley, where the Court upheld the right to view obscene
pornography privately in one’s home.523 Commentators noted that
granting the right to view obscene pornography in one’s home
strongly suggested that one had the right to acquire it outside the
home, which, in turn, suggested that others had the right to
produce and sell it.524 Otherwise, how would the average consumer
secure the obscene pornography for private viewing? However, the
Supreme Court subsequently maintained the constitutional line
that it had drawn in Stanley, rejecting arguments that the right to
view obscene pornography extended to public theaters or to the
right to distribute the material.525 The Supreme Court could do the
522. See id. at 8–9 (noting that the 2013 Board report, which was released in
2014, concluded that the approach of legalization and regulation in Washington
and Colorado was not in conformity with the treaties).
523. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (reaffirming that “the
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas”).
524. See, e.g., Gene R. Hoellrich, Note, Stanley v. Georgia: First Amendment
Approach to Obscenity Control, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 364, 368–69 (1970) (“If all
production and distribution of obscene material were banned, in the obscenity
context, the reception right would also be effectively banned.”).
525. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (holding that
“there are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of
commercialized obscenity”); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973)
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same with cannabis. The right to use marijuana in the home or to
possess small amounts in public need not extend to public
distribution. The Court could plausibly find that the interests of
states in regulating the commercial production and sale of
cannabis is sufficient to justify restrictions on those activities but
not the more basic right of the individual to use it privately or to
possess small amounts of it in public.
VI. Conclusion
This Article began by asking two questions about
constitutional law, one substantive and the other methodological.
The substantive question is whether the Constitution in the
foreseeable future could provide a limited right to use and possess
cannabis for recreational purposes. The methodological question is
whether the Supreme Court, after Obergefell, will use rights-based
clause aggregations to recognize more constitutional rights that it
would not recognize under any clause considered singularly. My
answer to both questions, despite some skepticism, is a qualified
yes. But, the larger idea of the article is that there is a benefit in
exploring these two problems together. There seems little chance
in the foreseeable future that the Supreme Court would recognize
a right to possess and use marijuana for recreational purposes
under any single clause in the Constitution. However, the idea
becomes more plausible with clause aggregation. Likewise, it is
difficult to identify with confidence many new rights that the Court
will acknowledge and protect through clause aggregation that it
could not fairly easily acknowledge and protect through a
single-clause analysis. However, a limited right to possess and use
a small amount of marijuana recreationally might be that kind of
liberty.

(rejecting constitutional protection for obscene material outside the home);
United States v. 12,200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973) (refusing to “extend
the precise, carefully limited holding of Stanley to permit importation of
admittedly obscene material simply because it is imported for private use only”).

